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Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of
Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for
Law and Legal Theory
David J. Arkush
This Article attempts to clarify legal thinking about emotion in
decision making. It surveys evidence from psychology and neuroscience
on the extensive role that emotion and related nonconscious cognitive
processes play in human behavior, then evaluates the treatment of
emotion in three legal views of decision making: rational choice theory,
behavioral economics, and cultural cognition theory. The Article
concludes that each theory is mistaken to treat emotion mostly as a
decision objective rather than a part of the decision-making process and,
indeed, to treat it as a force that mostly compromises that process. The
Article introduces the view that emotion is a critical behavioral process
that plays a role in most if not all decisions and is not readily amenable
to accumulation or maximization. The Article discusses broad
implications of this view for welfarist legal theory and policy generally
and for an ongoing debate on risk regulation between behavioral
economists and cultural cognition theorists. It also sketches potential
applications in the law of employment discrimination, consumer
protection, and criminal law.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a revolution has begun in legal thinking on
emotion in decision making. Rational choice theory, which holds
that decision making is emotionless, has been swept by “behavioral
economics,” which recognizes that many decisions are biased or
flawed, often for emotional reasons. More recently, “cultural
cognition theory” holds that emotion is rational and critical to
decisions, positing that behavioral economics is mistaken to treat
emotion as a distorting influence. This Article argues that each
theory is unsatisfactory in light of empirical evidence on the role of
emotion in decision making. The Article argues that the evidence
supports a fundamental theoretical shift on emotion: treating
emotion primarily as a behavioral process rather than an object of
decisions. This shift has broad implications for law, legal theory, and
policy in areas ranging from contract, tort, and criminal law to
administrative regulation and the laws governing democratic process.
This Article is situationist in that it treats emotion not as an
object of controlled thought and choices, but rather as one of many
underappreciated factors that cause behavior.1 This stance is dictated

1. See Jon D. Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: A Critical Realist Perspective on
the Human Animal, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon,
Situation]. Hanson and Yosifon adopted the term “situationism” from social psychology. In
that field, “situationism” refers to the view that behavior is produced more by contextual
factors and people’s attempts to respond to them (“the situation”) than by stable
characteristics within people (“dispositions”). See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T.
Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination and Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1039–40 (2006). I read Hanson and Yosifon as treating
stable personality characteristics, to the extent they exist, as part of the situation as well,
deeming them part of people’s “interior situations,” in contrast to situational factors outside
people’s bodies, which are “exterior situations.” See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J.
1 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character].
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by a methodological commitment to using the best available
evidence on how humans think, feel, and behave, with the caveat
that we must not overestimate our ability to attain knowledge
untainted by politics and our own limitations—an approach Jon
Hanson and David Yosifon have named critical realism.2 The project
of “situating emotion” is the critical-realist attempt to identify
emotion’s role among the many factors that produce behavior.
Part I of this Article briefly introduces the dominant view of
emotion in law, as reflected in rational choice theory and behavioral
economics. Drawing heavily on evidence from social psychology and
neuroscience, Part II discusses three major problems with this view,
each of which derives from treating emotion as an object of decisions
rather than a behavioral process. Part III introduces affirmative
evidence for a different view of emotion that has received little
attention in the legal literature: affect as the dominant biological
process that drives behavior. Part IV evaluates rational choice theory,
behavioral economics, and cultural cognition theory in light of the
empirical evidence, concluding that each is incomplete, inaccurate,
or incoherent. Part V outlines the view of emotion emerging from
empirical evidence, argues that it compares favorably with other
approaches, and sketches some implications of the view for law and
legal theory.
I. A CONTRADICTION ON EMOTION
Rational choice theory has always contained an odd
contradiction on emotion and reason.3 On the one hand, it treats
emotion as undesirable and exceptional in decision making. On the
2. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 179–92. Jerry Kang and
Mahzarin R. Banaji have similarly called for “behavioral realism.” Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2004). I take behavioral realism to share critical
realism’s commitment to basing law and legal theory on the most realistic understanding of
human behavior available. Hanson and Yosifon, however, have rightly emphasized that we
should maintain “reservations about how ‘knowable’ our world is, about the existence of truly
neutral, apolitical social sciences and legal doctrines, and about the independence of judges,
scholars, and other reputedly neutral actors and institutions.” Hanson & Yosifon, Situation,
supra note 1, at 182.
3. Despite its multi-decade prominence, “rational choice theory” lacks a settled
definition. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060–
64 (2000). I use the phrase to refer to expected utility theory, the most common form of
rational choice theory, id. at 1062, as employed to make normative claims. Exemplars are
Richard Posner, Louis Kaplow, and Steven Shavell.
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other, it sets emotion as the principal (if not exclusive) goal of
decisions. This tension is worth exploring because it illustrates the
major flaw in mainstream views of emotion: treating emotion
primarily as an object of decisions and failing to understand its role in
the decision-making process.
A. Undesirable Emotion
Rational choice theory follows a long Western tradition of
treating emotion primarily as negative influence. In this view,
emotion is the opposite of reason, an untrustworthy force that
cripples judgment.4 Thankfully, given its destructiveness, emotion is
also rare, lasting only for brief states such as fear, rage, bliss, or a
visceral craving.5 Aside from these occasional episodes, we are mostly
emotionless decision makers.
More recently, authors in a school termed “behavioral
economics” have discussed numerous “flaws” or “biases” in human
rationality, many of which are emotional in nature.6 This represents
less change from rational choice theory than appears at first glance.
Like rational choice theorists, behavioral economists see emotion as a
flaw that impairs proper—meaning “rational”—thought.7 Rational
choice theory already accepted that emotions occasionally influence
decisions; behavioral economics only expands the account of the
frequency and means by which this happens.

4. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision
Making, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 620–21 (Davidson et al. eds., 2003);
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND.
L.J. 155, 159–60 & n.28 (2005) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting]; Terry A.
Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 119 (2006).
5. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Human
Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 273 (1996) [hereinafter
Loewenstein, Out of Control].
6. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
7. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE LAWS OF FEAR (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
FEAR]. This accords with their oft-professed aim of developing and enhancing rational choice
theory rather than undermining it. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1074–75; Tanina
Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and
Economics Movement, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 973, 974–75 (2000).
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B. Crucial Emotion
Despite this apparent distaste for emotion in decision making,
rational choice theorists and behavioral economists are committed to
emotion when it goes by another name. They call this emotion
“preferences,” “utility,” and “welfare.” Scholars have expended little
effort defining these terms, but it is clear that they signify emotional
well-being. For example, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, who
have written extensively on welfare, use “utility” and “welfare” to
“refer to the well-being of an individual”8 and further define “wellbeing” as whatever pleases us minus whatever displeases us.9 The
term “preferences” also signifies emotion because it is identical to
“welfare”: welfare is the sum of satisfied preferences, and preferences
are predictions of expected welfare.10 Thus, the terms refer to the
same emotional objects of decisions at different phases of the
decision-making process. Preferences are input-stage emotions that,
once obtained, become output-stage utility or welfare.11
C. Synthesis: The Emotionless Pursuit of Emotion
Thus, we see that the object of our mostly emotionless choices is,
oddly, emotion: Rational choice theory holds that people choose,
without emotion, outcomes that will generate positive emotion.
Behavioral economists employ the same structure, varying only their
recognition that many decisions are irrational for various reasons,
one of which is the interference of emotion. Economists also reverse
this equation to infer preferences: because people rationally choose
the best means of satisfying their preferences, we can say that they
desire the results of their actions—that their choices reveal their
8. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
979 (2001); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 595
(2004) (defining a person’s “utility” as an “indicator of his well-being, whatever might
constitute that well-being”).
9. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 980 (“[W]ell-being . . . incorporates in a positive
way everything that an individual might value . . . [and] in a negative way harms to his or her
person and property, costs and inconveniences, and anything else the individual might find
distasteful.”).
10. A set of preferences is usually viewed as a state of the world or a bundle of goods.
See Preferences, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2006); Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 8, at 979 & n.33; see also SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 595 n.1.
11. Additionally, Kaplow and Shavell rely on work that expressly uses the term
“emotion” to signify preferences and utility. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 983 n.39
(citing JONATHAN BARON, MORALITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 144 (1993)).
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preferences.12 Thus, policymakers can determine the value of goods
and services and define welfare simply by watching what people do in
well-working markets.
At a minimum, this approach suffers from internal tension. It
assumes that emotion is mostly irrelevant or dangerous in decisions
but that decisions reflect attempts to pursue emotion. Further, this
approach assumes curiously that people perceive, evaluate, and
pursue emotion without feeling it.13 The precise locus of tension is
the hidden assumption that there are two types of emotion in
decisions—emotion in the decision-making process and emotion as a
decision object—and that the former is bad and the latter good. I
argue below that this view is wholly mistaken, that emotion is critical
to the decision-making process—sometimes helpful, sometimes
harmful, but always necessary—and that welfare as commonly
conceived is an illusory decision object. In short, the dominant view
is backward.
II. PROBLEMS WITH VIEWING EMOTIONS AS OBJECTS
This Part discusses problems with viewing emotions as objects of
decision making at each stage of the mainstream decision-making
model: input (“preferences”), outcomes (“welfare”), and behavior
(“choices”). First, however, let us make the discussion more concrete
with a metaphor similar to one Shavell recommends. Imagine we
each have a brain cavity that we can fill with utility chemicals—a
well-being cup.14 At any given point in time, we have a certain
quantity of chemicals in our cups, and we rank potential states of the

12. See, e.g., Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 322–23 (1977) (“If you are observed to choose x
rejecting y, you are declared to have ‘revealed’ a preference for x over y. . . . The rationale of
this approach seems to be based on the idea that the only way of understanding a person’s real
preference is to examine his actual choices . . . .”).
13. Also, its definition of “preferences” is circular. To ascertain preferences, we examine
behavior and, to predict behavior, we look at preferences. See id. at 325. Another cause for
concern is that many entities committed to influencing both our behavior and our perceptions
of our behavior, primarily business interests, promote this theory even though they do not
believe it. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson &
Kysar, TBS I]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson &
Kysar, TBS II]; Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 160–61.
14. See SHAVELL, supra note 8, at 596 n.2.
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world based on the chemicals they will provide us. These rankings
are preferences. We then choose among world-states to maximize
the amount of good chemicals that flow into our cups, and
policymakers can tell what we value simply by looking in them.
Finally, take the metaphor one step further, and imagine you are in a
restaurant. Your utility chemicals go into a cup on the table rather
than a brain cavity, and your potential preferences are on the drink
menu. Now let us look at your preferences, choices, and welfare.
A. Problems with Preferences: Tap Water or Evian? Small or Tall?
1. Miswanting
The first problem with preferences is that many are mistaken—
deeply mistaken. Much of what we seek and aspire to yields far less
happiness than we imagine. In terms of the cup metaphor, we often
discover that our drinks do not taste as we expected. Or they taste
right, but we learn that we want something different than we
thought. Or, for no apparent reason, the drinks simply do not please
us as expected. Psychologist Dan Gilbert calls this phenomenon
“miswanting.”15
Our relationship to money is probably the best-documented
example of miswanting. Correlations between wealth and happiness
vary somewhat from study-to-study,16 but one conclusion remains
consistent: increased wealth or income provides little or no
additional happiness to people who are not poor.17 Curves plotting
well-being and annual income abruptly plateau above middle class
levels.18 One recent study inferred that increasing happiness by one
point on a ten-point scale would take at least an 800,000% increase

15. Daniel Gilbert & Timothy Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of
Future Affective States, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL
COGNITION 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000). Others have discussed evidence of miswanting
and other so-called “affective forecasting” problems in the legal literature. See Blumenthal,
Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 163 & n.44; Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character,
supra note 1, at 118–19. I discuss the evidence thoroughly because it is relatively new to legal
scholarship and because I integrate it into a holistic view of emotion.
16. Michael Argyle, Causes & Correlates of Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 353, 356–58 (Kahneman et al. eds., 2003).
17. Id. at 358; David G. Myers, The Funds, Friends, & Faith of Happy People, 55 AM.
PSYCHOL. 56, 59 (2000).
18. Argyle, supra note 16, at 356.
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in income,19 and another found that although average national
income in the United States grew from $9000 to $20,000 between
1957 and 1998, happiness declined slightly, from 35% to 33%.20
Studies of national wealth and well-being also have found that the
correlation between increased wealth and well-being disappears once
national wealth grows above a relatively low floor—$8000 gross
national product per capita in one study21 and $12,000 gross
domestic product per capita in another.22
Additionally, several studies suggest that wealth can correlate
negatively with happiness.23 Some researchers theorize that increased
income or wealth may increase our focus on money at the expense of
aspects of life that bring more happiness.24 This may lead us to
“misallocate” time, for example, by “accepting lengthy commutes
(which are among the worst moments of the day)” or “sacrificing
time spent socializing (which are among the best moments of the
day).”25 Some have even suggested that high income can focus
attention on wealth in a pattern similar to drug addiction.26
19. Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Paul Frijters, How Important Is Methodology for the
Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness?, 114 ECON. J. 641, 656 (2004). Another study
suggests that the wealthiest people in the United States are at most only slightly happier than
those with average incomes. Diener and his colleagues found that 49 people with incomes over
$10 million reported being happy 77% of the time whereas people with average incomes
reported being happy 62% of the time. Ed Diener, Jeff Horwitz & Robert A. Emmons,
Happiness of the Very Wealthy, 16 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 263, 263–74 (1985).
20. Myers, supra note 17, at 61. Similarly, a 500% increase in income in Japan between
1958 and 1987 did not increase reported happiness. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein,
Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302,
313 (Kahneman et al. eds., 2003); Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You
Were Richer?, 312 SCI. 1908, 1909 (2006).
21. Myers, supra note 17, at 59. (“Better so far as happiness and life satisfaction go to
be Irish than Bulgarian. But whether one is Irish, Belgian, Norwegian, or American hardly
matters.”).
22. Kahneman et al., supra note 20, at 1909. Although increased wealth correlates with
greater happiness in poor countries, the correlation “is surprisingly weak (indeed, virtually
negligible)” in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Myers, supra note 17, at 59; see also id.
(“People who go to work in their overalls and on the bus are just as happy, on the average, as
those in suits who drive to work in their own Mercedes.” (citing DAVID LYKKEN, HAPPINESS:
THE NATURE AND NURTURE OF JOY AND CONTENTMENT 17 (Golden Books 1999))).
23. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, If We Are So Rich, Why Aren’t We Happy?, 54 AM.
PSYCHOL. 821 (1999).
24. Argyle, supra note 16, at 358; Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 23, at 823; Kahneman
et al., supra note 20, at 1910. In general, people who score highly on measures of materialism
are less happy than others. Argyle, supra note 16, at 358.
25. Kahneman et al., supra note 20, at 1910. Other research has suggested that people
who value money highly are less happy because they are motivated by “social comparison,
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This knowledge, to the extent it has been disseminated, has not
extinguished our “preference” for increased wealth. Moreover,
money is far from the only example of miswanting, and many are
much more surprising. For example, although close relationships—
particularly marriage and other close romantic relationships—are
strongly correlated with happiness,27 having children, a widespread
voluntary human activity, has mixed effects at best28 and may even
diminish happiness.29 Also, children appear to decrease marital
happiness, which declines once they are born and begins to rise again
when they start leaving the home.30
Perhaps even more surprising, merely having choices can
diminish happiness, and having fewer choices can increase happiness.
In exemplary studies of this phenomenon, Dan Gilbert and Jane
Ebert measured satisfaction with revocable and irrevocable choices
regarding material possessions and found that participants were
happier with objects they chose when the decisions were
irrevocable.31 Such outcomes are obviously surprising. A majority of
people reading the procedure for the former studies expressed a
preference to be among those whose decisions were changeable.32

seeking power, showing off, and overcoming self-doubt.” Abhishek Srivastava, Edwin A. Locke
& Kathryn M. Bartol, Money and Subjective Well-Being: It’s Not the Money, It’s the Motives, 80
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 959 (2001).
26. Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 23, at 823 (citing MICHAEL BENEDIKT, VALUES
(Univ. of Texas Press 1999); STAFFAN LINDER, THE HARRIED LEISURE CLASS (Columbia
Univ. Press 1970); TIBOR SCITOVSKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY (Random House 1975)).
27. Marriage likely increases happiness more than any other relationship. Argyle, supra
note 16, at 359–62; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, supra note 19, at 649; Myers, supra note
17, at 63. Of course, people must be happy with their marriages. Myers, supra note 17, at 62–
63. Close relationships with other family, friends, coworkers, and fellow members of churches
also are positively correlated with both happiness and better physical health. Id.
28. Argyle, supra note 16, at 360.
29. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 220–21 (2006); Ferrer-i-Carbonell
& Frijters, supra note 19, at 649.
30. GILBERT, supra note 29, at 220–21.
31. Daniel Gilbert & Jane E. J. Ebert, Decisions & Revisions: The Affective Forecasting of
Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503 (2002). In one study,
subjects chose one of two photographs they had taken. Half were allowed to change their
minds within five days. Within two days, those whose decisions were irrevocable liked their
photographs more than those permitted to change their minds, and this effect remained even
after the opportunity to exchange photographs expired. A second study using art posters found
similar results. Id. at 505–09.
32. Id. at 510–11; see also George Loewenstein, Costs and Benefits of Health and
Retirement-Related Choice, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VS.
COLLECTIVE RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY (Sheila Burke, Eric Kingson & Uwe Reinhardt eds.,
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We miswant in a variety of other circumstances as well, from
trifles such as the next meal to major life decisions such as our career
paths.33 Psychologists have put forth compelling explanations for the
phenomenon,34 and neuroscientists have begun ascertaining its
neural basis.35 Those literatures are beyond the scope of this Article.
Here, it suffices to say that many common conceptions of what
makes us happy are surprisingly mistaken, and we regularly
mispredict what will please us.36 In terms of the metaphor, it is as if
our drinks do not taste as expected or, when we receive them, we
realize we want something else. Or it is as if one of our favorite
beverages does not increase our happiness and, in fact, may even
harm us. Imagine that.

2000) (arguing that choice is less desirable when it will not enhance competition, when it
drains time, when people lack expertise and are prone to making poor decisions, and when
people will face high levels of anxiety and regret about the choice); BARRY SCHWARTZ,
PARADOX OF CHOICE (2005); Nicola J. Bown, Daniel Read & Barbara Summers, The Lure of
Choice, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 297 (2003). We may feel that some of these findings
are obvious, but strong evidence suggests that they are not. Regarding wealth, for example, a
1984 Roper poll found that when “[a]sked how satisfied they were with 13 aspects of their
lives, including friends, house, and schooling, Americans expressed least satisfaction with ‘the
amount of money you have to live on.’” Myers, supra note 17, at 58. When asked in another
survey what would improve their lives most, Americans’ most common answer was “more
money.” Id. Another found that people who earned under $30,000 per year reported needing
$50,000 in order to be happy, and people who earned over $100,000 reported needing
$250,000. Id. In another, half of women, two-thirds of men, and four-fifths of people earning
over $75,000 said they would like to be rich. Id. We think we know that money does not buy
happiness, but the evidence suggests otherwise.
33. Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 15, at 178–79; see also George Loewenstein & David
Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOL. 85, 88 (Kahneman et al. eds., 2003).
34. Gilbert and Wilson identify several reasons for miswanting, but they are beyond the
scope of this Article. See Gilbert & Wilson, supra note 15, at 179–83.
35. Kent Berridge, Food Reward: Brain Substrates of Wanting and Liking, 20
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1 (1996) (finding distinct brain structures in rats for
“wanting” (being motivated to obtain something) and “liking” (pleasure)).
36. We should be careful not to overstate miswanting; we know what we want in many
circumstances. Daniel Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 617, 617 (1998) (“[M]ost people recognize
that a weekend in Paris would be more enjoyable than gallbladder surgery, and few people fear
chocolate or tingle in anticipation of next year’s telephone directory.”); Loewenstein &
Schkade, supra note 33, at 99. The point remains, however, that we are often mistaken about
what makes us happy in decisions large and small.
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2. Inconsistency & manipulability
A second problem with preferences is that we cannot nail them
down. Countless studies, discussed in the legal literature as
“behavioral economics,” show that what we call preferences are often
irrational and context-specific. Because these problems have been
discussed widely,37 I will not recount them in detail. The major
points are simple: our preferences in a given situation can be altered
in a variety of ways, for example by making certain options more
salient than others,38 rewording or reframing a choice without
changing its actual content,39 and so on.40 In terms of the metaphor,
it is as if the restaurant can influence our orders by altering the
menu’s layout or terms, induce us to drink more or less by altering
the size of our cups,41 and increase our patronization of the
establishment by making us feel that the owner, even when a
corporation rather than a human being, is a good citizen.
B. A Problem with Welfare: A Hole in the Bucket
Preference problems suggest that decisions are difficult because
we often do not know what is good for us. But what about when we
get it right? Unfortunately, even when we obtain positive welfare, it
leaves us surprisingly quickly. (The silver lining is that bad emotions
also fade quickly.) In a famous 1978 study, Brickman, Coates, and
Janoff-Bulman found that neither winning the lottery nor becoming

37. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW].
38. This is the “availability heuristic.” See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 163, 164 (1982).
39. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors,
Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 ORGIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296,
305–07 (1992); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 271–73 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981).
40. See generally SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW, supra note 37; Hanson & Kysar, TBS I,
supra note13; Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1499, 1503–06 (1998).
41. This is absolutely correct. See Brian Wansink, James E. Painter & Jill North,
Bottomless Bowls: Why Visual Cues of Portion Size May Influence Intake, 13 OBESITY RES. 93
(2005).
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permanently disabled affects happiness as much as we would expect
after a short passage of time.42 The researchers compared self-ratings
of happiness between people who had won $50,000 to $1,000,000
in the state lottery within the past year, people who had become
paraplegic or quadriplegic within the past year, and a control group.
When asked to estimate their happiness on a five-point scale, lottery
winners averaged 4.00, whereas members of the control group
averaged 3.82.43 More surprisingly, people who became paraplegic or
quadriplegic within the past year rated their happiness at 2.96, a level
not terribly lower, and still solidly above the hypothetical neutral
point of 2.50.44 This was true even though participants rated the
experience of becoming disabled 1.28.45 The experience of being
disabled was not nearly as bad as we might have expected. At a
minimum, it was more happy than not.
The phenomenon of emotions fading quickly has been
confirmed in a host of other circumstances, such as watching one’s
favorite team win or lose a game,46 breaking up with a girlfriend or
boyfriend,47 watching one’s preferred candidate lose an election,48
gaining or failing to gain tenure at a major university,49 being placed

42. Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery Winners and
Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).
43. Id. at 920–21. The researchers later bolstered their findings by following up to
ensure that the results were not distorted by factors such as preexisting differences in happiness
between those who buy lottery tickets and those who do not. Id. at 921–23.
44. Id. at 920–21.
45. Id. at 920. Winning the lottery rated 3.78. Id. Later studies have reached similar
conclusions. See generally Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 312; Camile B.
Wortman & Roxane C. Silver, Coping with Irrevocable Loss, in CATACLYSMS, CRISES &
CATASTROPHES: PSYCHOLOGY IN ACTION 189, 197–99 (Gary R. VandenBos & Brenda K.
Bryant eds., 1987); Richard Schulz & Susan Decker, Long-Term Adjustment to Physical
Disability: The Role of Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-Blame, 48 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1162, 1166–68, 1170–72 (1985). This is not to say that people suffering from
serious injuries are not very unhappy at times; it is only to say that they are far less unhappy
than expected. Id. at 198. Frederick and Loewenstein note that people do not adapt as well to
chronic or progressive diseases, but this is probably because the progressive nature of such
diseases continually presents new problems, making emotional adaptation more difficult.
Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 312.
46. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 823–29 (2000).
47. Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 620–22.
48. Id. at 624–26.
49. Gilbert and his colleagues surveyed all assistant professors and all former assistant
professors in the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin between 1984 and
1994 who either had achieved tenure, or had been formally considered but failed to achieve it
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in solitary confinement in prison,50 losing a loved one51 (including a
child),52 or learning that one has HIV53 or cancer.54 In each case,
evidence suggests that people inaccurately predict the durability of
changes in their happiness.55
This evidence has led some to inquire whether we have
something akin to a happiness or life-satisfaction set-point to which
we eventually return after emotional events.56 At a minimum, it

in any department other than psychology. Professors correctly predicted that the emotional
impact of tenure decisions fades over time, but failed to predict how little tenure decisions
affect short-term happiness and how quickly the effects fade. Id. at 622–24.
50. Prisoners seem to under-predict adaptation to solitary confinement. Loewenstein &
Schkade, supra note 33, at 90. Studies on imprisonment generally suggest that although
people have great initial emotional difficulty, they tend to adapt over time. However, wellbeing deteriorates again when release dates draw near, “presumably because [prisoners] begin
to compare incarceration with the freedom they are beginning to anticipate.” Frederick &
Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 311–12.
51. Eunkook Suh, Ed Diener & Frank Fujita, Events and Subjective Well Being: Only
Recent Events Matter, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1091, 1093–97 (1996)
(conducting a study of recent college graduates).
52. Wortman and Silver interviewed approximately 125 parents who had lost an infant
to sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) three weeks, three months, and eighteen months
afterward. At three weeks, negative feelings were hardly more prevalent than positive feelings.
Within three months, positive feelings predominated, and within eighteen months, the
frequency of positive feelings was not significantly different from that for people who had not
lost a child. Also, it is not the case that people felt unhappy less frequently but more intensely;
positive feelings were consistently more intense than negative feelings. See Wortman & Silver,
supra note 45, at 199–201.
53. Elaine M. Sieff, Robyn M. Dawes & George Loewenstein, Anticipated Versus
Actual Reaction to HIV Test Results, 112 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (1999).
54. Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 618.
55. Loewenstein and Frederick found related results in a broad study on a long list of
changes that people expect to impact their happiness: environmental changes (“levels of local
air pollution, rain forest destruction, restriction of sport-fishing due to pollution, and recovery
of certain endangered species”), social changes (“increase in number of coffee shops and cafés,
increase in number of television channels and selection of videotapes, reduced risk of nuclear
war, and increased risk of AIDS”), and personal changes (“change in free time, development of
pain-causing chronic health condition, change in household income, and increase in body
weight”). Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 90. Of course there were some
methodological problems with the study, as not every person surveyed experienced each
circumstance predicted. However, “a clear general pattern emerged from the data.” Id. People
usually overestimate the impact of a change but sometimes underestimate it. For example,
researchers found in a 1982 study that people living near a new highway apparently
overestimated their ability to adapt to highway noise. Id.
56. See Ed Diener & Richard E. Lucas, Personality & Subjective Well-Being, in WELLBEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 213, 221–22 (Kahneman et al. eds.,
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appears that sources of happiness should be classified into those that
provide short-term, intermediate-term, and long-term benefits, with
very few falling in the last category.57 This means that many of our
choices have little impact on our long-term happiness, and much of
our worrying over them is misguided. The upside, of course, is that
we can fear poor decisions less.58
As with miswanting, I do not wish to overstate this
phenomenon. However, it clearly exists and contributes to poor
decisions in important instances. For example, people overestimate
the impact of receiving bad news about health,59 which can lead
them to avoid medical testing when it would benefit them.60
Similarly, people tend to over-predict the despair that terminal illness
brings and to underestimate the quality of life of the disabled and

2003); Suh, Diener & Fujita, supra note 51, at 1095 (“Our findings support the [dynamic
equilibrium] model’s prediction that SWB [subjective well-being] reverts to a level
predetermined by individuals’ personality as soon as the pattern of life events regains its
equilibrium. According to our findings, this regression process probably takes several
months.”). One study surveyed over 2000 middle-aged identical twins and found that
education, income, socioeconomic class, marital status, and religious commitment each
accounted for at most three percent of variance in reported well-being. David Lykken & Auke
Tellegen, Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 186 (1996). The most
reliable predictor of one twin’s happiness was the other twin’s happiness. Id. at 189; see also
DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE 181–82 (2006) [hereinafter GOLEMAN, SOCIAL
INTELLIGENCE] (citing Richard J. Davidson & William Irwin, The Functional Neuroanatomy of
Emotion and Affective Style, 3 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 11 (1999)); Ed Diener & Carol
Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 181 (1996); Frank Fujita & Ed Diener, Life
Satisfaction Set Point: Stability and Change, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 158 (2005);
Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness:
Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 527 (2003).
57. Fujita & Diener, supra note 56, at 162–163.
58. Many theories exist to explain why emotions fade quickly, but they are beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 20; see also Kahneman,
Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING 3, 13–15 (Kahneman et al. eds., 1999); Philip Brickman
& Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society, in ADAPTATIONLEVEL THEORY: A SYMPOSIUM 287 (M. H. Appley ed., 1971); Brickman, Coates & JanoffBulman, supra note 42, at 918; Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 619–20; Myers, supra note 17,
at 60; Wilson et al., supra note 46, at 822–23.
59. See, e.g., Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91 (finding that people “do not
seem extremely adversely affected when they” learn that they have or are at increased risk of
having Huntington’s disease, though many resist being tested); Sieff, Dawes & Loewenstein,
supra note 53, at 307 (finding “anticipated distress” higher than “reported distress” among
people who test positive for HIV).
60. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91; Sieff, Dawes & Loewenstein, supra
note 53, at 297.

1289

ARKUSH.FIN

11/24/2008 5:05 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2008

infirm.61 Thus, they may make poor decisions regarding living wills62
and the value of medical procedures for the terminally ill.63
Thus, positive and negative welfare states tend to be
unexpectedly transitory, making it difficult for us to make accurate
decisions about maintaining or avoiding them. Returning to the
metaphor, it is as if our cups are actually sieves—or as if no matter
what or how much we drink today, our stomachs will be empty
tomorrow.
C. A Problem with Choice: Water Under the Bridge
Now we turn to “choices,” which suffer problems of their own.
Even when we know what we want, and even if we knew how to
keep it, we have difficulty executing our plans. Examples abound of
our making decisions contrary to our expressed desires. Classic
examples include overeating, drug use, and gambling,64 but these are
only the most obvious situations in which we act against our better
judgment.
Many social psychologists place cognitions on a continuum
between “cold” (relatively uninfluenced by emotion or other nonconscious processes) and “hot” (characterized by greater emotional
arousal and influenced more heavily, or even controlled by, emotion
or other nonconscious processes).65 Economist George Loewenstein,
who has extensively researched people’s views and actions under hot
and cold conditions, observed that people in cooler states of mind
have difficulty predicting how they will act under the influence of
“visceral factors such as the cravings associated with drug addiction,
61. Glenn Affleck & Howard Tennen, Construing Benefits from Adversity: Adaptational
Significance and Dispositional Underpinnings, 64 J. PERSONALITY 899, 901–02 (1996);
Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 92 (citing Gina Kolata, Living Wills Aside Dying
Cling to Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997, at C10).
62. One study of 4804 terminally ill patients found that 688 had living wills, but those
patients sometimes changed their minds when near death. One of the researchers, a doctor,
commented: “Over and over again, they would say, ‘I’ve got a living will, but I’m not sick
enough yet.’” Gina Kolata, Documents Like Living Wills are Rarely of Aid, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1997, at A12.
63. Id. at C10.
64. A 2000 survey of 2630 Americans found that 82% percent had participated in some
form of gambling in the past year. See John W. Welte et al., Gambling Participation in the
U.S.—Results from a National Survey, 18 J. GAMBLING STUD. 313, 313, 316, 324 (2004).
Sixty-six percent played the lottery at least once in the past year, 13% played weekly, and 27%
had gambled in a casino at least once. Id. at 318–19, 324.
65. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 212–63 (1999).
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drive states (for example, hunger, thirst, and sexual desire), moods
and emotions, and physical pain.”66 Likewise, people in warmer
states of mind tend to overestimate the likelihood that people in
cooler states of mind will act as they do. Loewenstein calls this
discrepancy an empathy gap,67 meaning that the “cold” and “hot”
versions of our selves cannot empathize adequately with one another.
Loewenstein notes that strong visceral urges such as hunger, thirst,
sexual arousal, and pain “have the ability to change us so profoundly
that we’re more different from ourselves in different states than we
are from another person.”68
Several kinds of studies provide evidence of empathy gaps. Some
evidence stems from people’s predictions of their own behavior—in
particular, comparing the predictions that people in hot or cold
states make about their behavior in hot situations. These studies
show that people predict that they will act more emotionally in the
future if they are currently in a state of emotional arousal.69 Other
evidence stems from people’s predictions of others’ behavior, in

66. Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra note 5, at 272; see also George Loewenstein,
Daniel Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual
Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 445 (1997) (“When not hungry, afraid, angry,
or sexually aroused, people seem to have trouble imagining how they would feel, or how they
might act, when they experience these states.”). Loewenstein makes clear that he is speaking
only of a requisite intensity of emotional “warmth”: “At sufficient levels of intensity, these, and
most other visceral factors, cause people to behave contrary to their own long-term selfinterest, often with full awareness that they are doing so.” Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra
note 5, at 272–73 (emphasis added). He later adds, “at even greater levels of intensity, visceral
factors can be so powerful as to virtually preclude decision making.” Id. at 273.
67. Loewenstein, Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 66, at 445.
68. Jon Gertner, The Futile Pursuit of Happiness, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2003, at
44, 86.
69. A study examined the impact of sexual arousal on male college students’ predictions
of their own sexual aggression. Loewenstein, Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 66. Researchers
used a pre-textual picture-viewing activity to induce arousal in some subjects, but not others.
Id. at 448–51. Subjects then read a story written in the second person about meeting a female
student, “Susan,” who has a reputation for promiscuity, in a bar, returning to her apartment
with her, and engaging in kissing and heavy petting. Id. at 450. The story stops when “you”
[the subject] attempt to remove Susan’s clothing and she “tells you that she thinks that she is
not interested in having sex but does not try to physically stop you.” Id. Subjects were then
asked to predict the likelihood that they would (1) try to coax Susan to let them remove her
clothes, and (2) “have sex with her even if she protested.” Id. Students who were sexually
aroused in advance of reading the story predicted a substantially higher likelihood they would
try to coax Susan to remove her clothes. Id. at 455–56.
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which people in emotional states predict that others will act
emotionally.70
If predictions of behavior vary with emotional states, it seems
likely that behavior does as well. However, these studies do not
examine actual behavior and cannot draw the link completely.71
Others have. For example, Ron Gold approached roughly 700 gay
men in bars and inquired whether they had engaged in unprotected
anal intercourse in the past six months and, in doing so, had broken
their own safe-sex rules. Between one-quarter and one-third of the
men answered affirmatively.72 Furthermore, 138 of the men agreed
to participate in a study on the effectiveness of various forms of safe
sex educational materials, keeping diaries for sixteen weeks while
receiving various sex education materials. At the outset of the study,
34% reported having engaged in unprotected anal sex with one
partner in the past six months, 33% reported having done so with
two partners, and 33% reported having done so with more than two
partners. Remarkably, 64% of the men reported having broken their
own rules during the study, some more than once, even while
keeping sexual diaries for researchers.73
Finally, numerous studies have found evidence of empathy gaps
through direct comparison of predictions or plans with subsequent
behavior. For example, a majority of pregnant women who intend to
decline anesthesia during childbirth change their minds during labor,

70. For example, in the study of sexual arousal and aggression, participants in the
arousal group also rated other students as more likely to behave aggressively with Susan. This
effect was much less dramatic however. Id. at 464–65. Loewenstein and Van Boven examined
this phenomenon more directly in a study involving the impact of thirst on participants’
predictions of others’ behavior. Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of
Transient Drive States, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159 (2003). Subjects read
a narrative in which hikers become hopelessly lost without food or water and were asked to
predict their own and the hikers’ hunger and thirst in the situation. Half the participants had
exercised vigorously for twenty minutes before reading the story and answering questions.
They were warmer and thirstier, but no hungrier, than other participants. Those who had just
exercised were more likely than others to predict that they and the hikers would be more
thirsty than hungry, and they more frequently predicted regrets about not having packed extra
water than extra food. Furthermore, only people who exercised and felt thirsty predicted
significantly more thirst; those who had exercised but did not report feeling particularly thirsty
did not predict more thirst. Id. at 1163–65.
71. See Loewenstein, Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 66, at 465–67.
72. Ron Gold, Why We Need to Rethink AIDS Education for Gay Men, 7 AIDS CARE
S11 (1995). In another study, 51% of 79 gay men approached in a bar reported having
engaged in UAI in the past six months. Id.
73. Id. Only 109 of the men completed the study. Id.
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even among women who have previously given birth.74 Military
trainees overestimate the fear they will feel in parachuting.75 Even
casual smokers overestimate the likelihood they will quit smoking
within five years.76 Hungry grocery shoppers make more unplanned
food purchases than non-hungry shoppers unless they guide their
decisions with grocery lists.77 People overestimate the pain they will
feel at the dentist78 and famously underestimate their willingness to
deliver painful electric shocks to others when pressured by
researchers—even when they are aware at the time of the prediction
that most people succumb to such pressure.79 People also
underestimate the extent to which objects they obtain will suddenly
become more valuable to them—known as the endowment effect—
even when they know they may soon possess an object.80 They also
underestimate the influence of curiosity on their choices,81 their
willingness to accept minor embarrassments in exchange for
money,82 their ability to maintain zero balances on credit cards,83 and
their likelihood of mailing in rebate forms.84

74. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 93 (citing B.S. LYNCH & R.J. BONNIE, Toward a Youth-Centered Prevention
Policy, in GROWING UP TOBACCO-FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN
AND YOUTHS 3–25 (B.S. Lynch & R.J. Bonnie eds., 1994)); see also Loewenstein, Out of
Control, supra note 5, at 286.
77. Daniel T. Gilbert, Michael J. Gill & Timothy D. Wilson, The Future Is Now:
Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting, 88 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
430, 439 (2002).
78. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 91 (citing Gerry Kent, Memory of Dental
Pain, 21 PAIN 187–94 (1985)). Note that people do not always mispredict pain. Studies have
found that people can fairly accurately predict their “utility” after radiation therapy and that
people who frequently experience headaches can accurately predict the pain of future
headaches. See id.
79. Id. at 93 (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1965)).
80. George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON.
J. 929, 929 (1995) (“The endowment effect refers to the tendency for people to value an
object more highly if they possess it than they would value the same object if they did not.”);
Leaf Van Boven, David Dunning & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between
Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment Effect, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 66–76 (2000) [hereinafter Van Boven et al., Empathy Gaps]; Leaf Van Boven,
George Loewenstein & David Dunning, Mispredicting the Endowment Effect: Underestimation
of Owners’ Selling Prices by “Buyer’s Agents,” 51 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 351 (2003).
81. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 33, at 93–94.
82. Leaf Van Boven, George Loewenstein & David Dunning, The Illusion of Courage in
Social Predictions: Underestimating the Impact of Fear of Embarassment on Other People, 96
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 130, 132 (2005) (citing Leaf Van Boven et al.,
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Loewenstein recalls a friend’s story of a flight during which the
airplane suddenly dived, and only half the oxygen masks dropped
from the cabin ceiling. In a panic, some people grabbed the masks of
children next to them.85 Few of us would predict acting so selfishly
or unfairly. But apparently this is only because we cannot adequately
empathize with the fear we would feel in a falling airplane and the
influence of that fear on our behavior.86 In terms of the cup
metaphor, it is as if even when we know what we should order, we
sometimes fail to do it. We order soda instead of water, or drink two
glasses of wine instead of one.
D. A Problem for the Model: Poor Service
Most discussions of the above problems treat them implicitly or
explicitly as informational issues, illustrations of “bounded
rationality.”87 In this view, “empathy gaps” and “affective
forecasting” errors are instances of insufficient knowledge about our
future feelings and behavior. The hope of this approach, albeit
sometimes implicit, is to provide better information so that we can
make better decisions or to design policies that will help us do so. If
we learn what makes us happy and what does not, we can change our
pursuits.88 And if we ascertain the emotional situations in which we
fail to behave as planned, we can avoid or remake them.89
This approach is commendable to a point. It resonates with our
experience of learning about ourselves and attempting to change our
behavior, and we certainly need better information to make better

The Illusion of Courage in Self Predictions: Underestimating the Impact of Fear of
Embarrassment on the Self (unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado, Boulder)).
83. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81
AM. ECON. REV. 50, 70–72 (1991) (finding that 75% of consumers carry balances although
47% report that they “nearly always pay in full”).
84. Loewenstein & Adler, supra note 80, at 929 (citing P. Tat, W.A. Cunningham & E.
Babakus, Consumer Perceptions of Rebates, 28 J. ADVERTISING RES. 45–50 (1988)).
85. Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra note 5, at 284.
86. Note that Loewenstein also recognizes the much more extensive influence of
emotion and automatic processes that this Article highlights. See id.
87. See GILBERT, supra note 29, at 238 (“Yes, we should make choices by multiplying
probabilities and utilities, but how can we possibly do this if we can’t estimate those utilities
beforehand?”); Loewenstein & Adler, supra note 80; Rostain, supra note 7.
88. Kaplow and Shavell, for example, deem these problems “mistaken preferences,”
which result from information problems. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 984, 1331–32.
89. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1978 (2001).
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decisions. But it is inadequate. First, it diverts our attention from
important questions. For example, research on “durability bias”
primarily concerns not the tendency of emotions to fade rapidly, but
rather whether individuals are aware of this fact and account for it in
decisions—the implication being that it is just another blind spot or
bias in decision making.90 But the potential problem of choices
having little influence on our long-term happiness is at least as
pressing as the question whether we know about this. Similarly,
research on empathy gaps focuses on whether we can predict our
behavior accurately.91 The question is important, but it distracts us
from more difficult questions such as why we have poor self-control
and what we can do about it. Moreover, merely knowing about these
phenomena may not help us much. Researchers in these areas have
little confidence that more or better information results in better
decisions.92
This point brings us to the more fundamental problem with the
information model. It proposes to remedy poor thinking, planning,
and self-control with more thinking, planning, and self-control. It
also requires that we constantly make decisions about how to make
decisions—when to calculate more elaborately and deliberatively,
when to use approximations and heuristics, when to settle for
something less than the best, and so on.93 A problem that has been
lurking throughout this discussion finally comes to the forefront:
who has time for even a small fraction of all this reasoning?
Numerous scholars have noted, particularly when discussing
heuristics and biases, that people cannot and do not consciously

90. Gilbert et al., supra note 36, at 617.
91. Van Boven et al., Empathy Gaps, supra note 80, at 66.
92. Gilbert expresses little hope, stating that “the information we need to make accurate
predictions of our emotional futures is right under our noses, but we don’t seem to recognize
its aroma.” GILBERT, supra note 29, at 233. He offers only that we can understand the reasons
we fail. Id. at 238.
93. For example, Sen once proposed adding to ordinary preferences several other sets,
including “meta-rankings” of preferences. Sen, supra note 12, at 336–39. Meta-rankings could
be used to “express[] what preferences one would have preferred to have” or “to analyze the
conflicts involved in addiction.” Id. at 339; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1077–
78 (“Even if a choice is not too complex for an actor to process physically, she might choose to
limit her search for information or consideration of the decision short of reaching a utilitymaximizing decision. The decision to adopt a simplified strategy might be sensible given the
marginal benefits and costs of making an optimal decision relative to a satisfactory one . . . .”).
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control everything they do,94 and that people are “cognitive misers”
who use mental resources sparingly.95 We often fail to consider
judgments carefully unless alerted to the possibility that our decisions
may be flawed,96 and even basic acts of self-control occupy such a
great proportion of cognitive resources that they must occur rarely.97
Such limitations led economists to propose long ago that people
engage in “satisficing” rather than “maximizing” behavior,
intentionally aiming for less than utility maximization because of the
difficulty in achieving it.98 Yet despite this recognition that people
cannot consider and make choices about all their actions, few legal
scholars have grappled seriously with how people get through their
lives without doing so, and what that means for law and legal

94. See Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 4; John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The
Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 464 (1999) (“Tice and
Baumeister concluded after their series of eight such experiments that because even minor acts
of self-control, such as making a simple choice, use up this limited self-regulatory resource,
such conscious acts of self-regulation can occur only rarely in the course of one’s day. Even as
they were defending the importance of the conscious self for guiding behavior, Baumeister et
al. . . . concluded it plays a causal role only 5% or so of the time.”). One illustration of the
limits of conscious cognition is the contrast in our nonconscious and conscious processing
powers. Our senses can process around eleven million bits of information per second, but we
can process at most fifty bits per second consciously. See Ap Dijksterhuis, Henk Aarts & Pamela
K. Smith, The Power of the Subliminal: On Subliminal Persuasion and Other Potential
Applications, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 77, 82 (Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A.
Bargh eds., 2005).
95. See John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of
Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361, 362
(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra
note 1, at 23 & n.72. The term “cognitive miser” was coined by social psychologists Shelley
Taylor and Susan Fiske in 1978. John A. Bargh, Social Psychological Approaches to
Consciousness, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS 556 (P. Zelazo, M.
Moscovitch & E. Thompson eds., 2007) [hereinafter Bargh, Consciousness] (citing Shelley
Taylor & Susan Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomena, in
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 249 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1978)).
96. Daniel T. Gilbert & Michael J. Gill, The Momentary Realist, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 394
(2000).
97. For example, the ability to persist in attempting to solve puzzles is seriously
diminished when people are asked to resist eating cookies placed in front of them, to choose
between two options, to try not to think about something particular, or to restrain emotional
responses to movies. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 465; Roy F. Baumeister et al.,
Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1252 (1998).
98. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1075–76 & n.81 (citing Herbert A. Simon,
Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, in MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND
RATIONAL 261, 270–71 (1957)).
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theory.99 Rational choice theory has no answer,100 and behavioral
economics provides only a piecemeal, situation-specific approach of
acknowledging various exceptions to the basic model.101
Fortunately, psychologists and neurobiologists have begun
finding an explanation, and it has much to do with emotion. Rather
than mere objects amenable to evaluation, prediction, and
stockpiling, emotions are ever-shifting processes that steer our
interactions with the environment. “Preferences” are a misnomer for
context-specific affective processes that sometimes have nothing to
do with long-term (or even short-term) well-being. “Choices” are
behavioral manifestations of those processes. And emotion’s nature
as a process explains why “welfare” gains are fleeting. In the
following section, I review evidence for these points.
III. A NAVIGATION SYSTEM FOR HOMO ECONOMICUS
Over the past few decades, the mainstream of social psychology
has moved away from the assumption that humans are aware of and
control most of their thought and behavior. Contemporary
researchers subscribe to various dual-processing models of cognition
and behavior, which hold that behavior is produced by both
intentional, conscious, “explicit” thought and unintentional,
nonconscious, “implicit” thought.102 Emotions are a large part of
this story because they modulate most cognitive and behavioral
processes and, indeed, appear to be critical to decisions.
Mounting evidence shows that emotions can operate
independently of, and precede, conscious or reasoned thought and
that nonconscious processing is vital to behavior. Just as we use
computers and other devices to automate certain tasks—from
autopilot devices in airplanes to voice mail for telephones—our

99. The important exception is Jon Hanson, who has followed social psychologists in
arguing for years that much behavior is produced not by reasoned choice or stable character
traits but by the circumstances in which people find themselves. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon,
Situation, supra note 1.
100. For example, Richard Posner has treated mistaken preferences as merely proof that
information costs are positive. RICHARD POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 259 (2001).
He does not answer how rational actors can function if these costs exceed the resources of any
human being.
101. Indeed, behavioral economists have eschewed the search for any general explanation
of behavior. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1074–75.
102. See generally KUNDA, supra note 65, at 265–68.
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brains work to automate our behavior.103 This means that the roots
of many of our attitudes and behaviors are beyond our control, and
even beyond our understanding through introspection.104 Just as we
cannot understand through introspection, much less control, how
our brains direct the movements of the muscle fibers in our legs as
we walk, our higher-order cognitive processes such as exercising
“will power,” pursuing goals, and reasoning about moral dilemmas
are often beyond our understanding and control.105
Although researchers originally thought nonconscious cognition
was limited to simple mental processes, they now believe that it
dominates our lives. Nonconscious behavioral processes are so
ubiquitous, robust, and effective that some are left wondering what
purpose conscious reasoning serves.106 Automaticity is everywhere,
and this is something we should celebrate.107 Below, this Article
103. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 464.
104. Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at 558 (“[R]ecent experimental evidence across
several different areas of psychology points to a deep and fundamental dissociation between
conscious awareness and the mental processes responsible for one’s behavior; many of the
wellsprings of behavior appear to be opaque to conscious access.”).
105. See, e.g., John A. Bargh, Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the Nonconscious
Control of Social Behavior, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 94, at 37, 41–42
[hereinafter Bargh, Bypassing the Will]; DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS
WILL (2002); John A. Bargh & Melissa J. Ferguson, Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity
of Higher Mental Processes, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 925 (2000) [hereinafter Bargh & Ferguson,
Beyond Behaviorism]; John F. Kihlstrom, The Cognitive Unconscious, 237 SCI. 1445, 1447
(1987).
106. Some believe it probably serves nonconsciousness—that the main function of
consciousness may be “to eliminate the need for itself in the future by making learned skills as
automatic as possible.” Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 53; see also id.
(“[M]etacognitive consciousness is the workplace where one can assemble and combine the
various components of complex perceptual-motor skills. This ability has given humans a
tremendous advantage over other animals, because ‘whereas most other species depend on
their built-in demons to do their mental work for them, we can build our own demons.’”
(quoting M. Donald, A MIND SO RARE 8 (2001))); Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at
563 (“In a very real sense, then, the purpose of consciousness—why it evolved—may be for the
assemblage of complex nonconscious skills.”). Antonio Damasio argues that conscious feelings
are necessary in addition to nonconscious affective process because there likely is a limit to the
complexity of problems that nonconscious processes can resolve. ANTONIO DAMASIO,
LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND THE FEELING BRAIN 176–79 (2003) [hereinafter
DAMASIO, SPINOZA].
107. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 464; see also id. at 462 (“[M]ost of momentto-moment psychological life must occur through nonconscious means if it is to occur at all.”).
This view is very old in psychology. See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY
122 (1890) (“The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless
custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own
proper work.”).
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reviews evidence of ways in which emotions and related
nonconscious processes assist us in navigating the world—evidence
that has broad implications for law, legal theory, and policy.
A. Evaluating the Environment
1. Instant evaluation
The story of nonconscious decision making begins with instant
evaluations. Nonconscious affective processes constantly judge our
surroundings, appraising nearly instantaneously what we encounter
as good or bad, before we have time to make cognitive evaluations
and often without our ever becoming aware of the affective
evaluations.108 In other words, we usually have feelings about things
before we think about them.109 Often, we have feelings about things
without ever thinking about them.
The key to studying automatic evaluation is measuring people’s
reactions in circumstances in which the reactions cannot have been
produced by deliberation. The classic model for such studies involves
exposing subjects to a positively or negatively valenced word (for
example, “cockroach”) so briefly that they cannot evaluate it
consciously before viewing a second word (such as “disgusting” or
“appealing”), which they are asked to evaluate as quickly as
possible.110 Studies consistently find that participants evaluate a
second stimulus more quickly if it follows a stimulus of the same
valence.111 This means that the subjects must have evaluated the first

108. Sheila T. Murphy, Feeling Without Thinking: Affective Primacy and the Nonconscious
Processing of Emotion, in UNRAVELING THE COMPLEXITIES OF SOCIAL LIFE: A FESTSCHRIFT
IN HONOR OF ROBERT B. ZAJONC (John A. Bargh & Deborah K. Apsley eds., 2001) (“[T]he
simple emotional or affective qualities of stimuli, such as good/bad, are processed extremely
quickly and efficiently without extensive perceptual and cognitive processing.”).
109. Robert Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980) [hereinafter Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking].
110. Russell H. Fazio, On the Automatic Activation of Associated Evaluations: An
Overview, 15 COGNITION & EMOTION 115, 116 (2001); see also John A. Bargh et al., The
Generality of the Automatic Attitude Activation Effect, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
893, 894 (1992) [hereinafter Bargh et al., Generality]; Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at
474.
111. Fazio, supra note 110, at 116; see also Melissa J. Ferguson & John A. Bargh, The
Constructive Nature of Automatic Evaluation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVALUATION:
AFFECTIVE PROCESSES IN COGNITION AND EMOTION 169 (Jocen Musch & Karl Christoph
Klauer eds., 2003) [hereinafter Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature]; Bargh et al.,
Generality, supra note 110, at 893–94.
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object, even though they had no time to do so consciously. Indeed,
people demonstrate instant evaluation even when stimuli are
presented simultaneously,112 and even when they cannot perceive the
stimuli consciously at all.113 A variety of studies have confirmed this
phenomenon.114
Some researchers initially thought automatic evaluations occur
only for objects that evoke strongly held attitudes, but later evidence
suggests the effect is much broader, likely occurring during all
encounters.115 Likewise, some once thought that automatic
evaluations occur only when people have been asked to evaluate
something recently,116 but later studies have shown that people
automatically evaluate objects without having been primed to do
so.117 In fact, the more researchers isolate nonconscious processes
from evaluative goals, the stronger the effect becomes.118 Similarly,
112. In early studies, the first stimulus was presented for 200 milliseconds, and the
second followed after an interval of 100 milliseconds. A later study on shorter evaluation
intervals found evidence of automatic evaluations even when the prime and target stimulus
were presented simultaneously and found that the effect was stronger for an interval of 150
milliseconds than the typical interval of 300 milliseconds. See Dirk Hermans, Jan De Houwer
& Paul Eelen, A Time Course Analysis of the Affective Priming Effect, 15 COGNITION &
EMOTION 143 (2001).
113. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, Sean C. Draine & Richard L. Abrams, Three
Cognitive Markers of Unconscious Semantic Activation, 273 SCI. 1699 (1996). There are two
thresholds for human perception: a subjective threshold at which a person consciously
perceives a stimulus and an objective threshold at which a third party can observe a physical
reaction demonstrating that another person’s body has perceived something, even though the
person cannot perceive it subjectively. See also Dijksterhuis, Aarts & Smith, supra note 94, at
79–80.
114. See, e.g., Bargh et al., Generality, supra note 110. This research initially provoked
strong opposition. When Robert Zajonc began studying automatic evaluation, he challenged
conventional wisdom in social psychology that emotional evaluations must have some cognitive
component—that people must think before they can prefer—a view that remains dominant in
law. But evidence for automatic evaluation has grown increasingly robust over time. See Fazio,
supra note 110, at 117–19. Note, however, that not all priming studies have been successfully
replicated. See Spruyt et al., On the Replicability of the Affective Priming Effect in the
Pronunciation Task, 51 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 109 (2004).
115. See Bargh et al., Generality, supra note 110, at 89495 (disputing Russell H. Fazio
et al., On the Automatic Evaluation of Attitudes, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
22938 (1986)).
116. See, e.g., John A. Bargh et al., The Automatic Evaluation Effect: Unconditional
Automatic Attitude Activation with a Pronunciation Task, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 104, 113 (1996) [hereinafter Bargh et al., Automatic Evaluation].
117. John A. Bargh, The Psychology of the Mere, in UNRAVELING THE COMPLEXITIES OF
SOCIAL LIFE, supra note 108, at 25, 2831 [hereinafter Bargh, Mere] (citing Bargh et al.,
Generality, supra note 110, at 893912).
118. Bargh et al., Automatic Evaluation, supra note 116, at 10920.
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priming done with people’s full awareness is more effective when
people believe it will not affect them.119 Moreover, strong evidence
also suggests that automatic evaluation is not simply a matter of
accessing previously stored judgments.120 People automatically
evaluate completely novel objects121 and appear to construct
evaluations in the moment, flexibly, with context-specific
variation.122
Studies have shown that people engage in automatic evaluations
of objects as diverse as words, line drawings, complex photographs of
real life, auditory stimuli, and pleasant and unpleasant odors.123 And
researchers have found evidence of automatic evaluations during a
variety of different tasks, such as evaluative categorization, lexical
decisions, pronunciation, and arm movements.124 Newer studies
using different techniques have bolstered earlier findings,125 and
current dispute concerns not whether automatic nonconscious
evaluation exists but “just how pervasive the effect is”126 and how it
operates.127 We appear to evaluate nearly everything we encounter

119. See, e.g., Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at 559.
120. Studies show, however, that some automatic evaluation is based on recall of previous
judgments. See, e.g., Luigi Castelli et al., On the Automatic Evaluation of Social Exemplars, 86
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 37482 (2004).
121. Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature, supra note 111; Kimberly L. Duckworth,
John A. Bargh, Magda Garcia & Shelly Chaiken, The Automatic Evaluation of Novel Stimuli,
13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 513, 51418 (2002).
122. See Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature, supra note 111, at 16985; Melissa J.
Ferguson & John A. Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility: Exploring the Knowledge Function of
Automatic Attitudes, in THE WISDOM IN FEELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 383, 389400 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility].
123. Hermans et al., supra note 112, at 144 (collecting studies).
124. Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive Nature, supra note 111, at 16985 (collecting
studies); Hermans et al., supra note 112, at 144.
125. Melissa J. Ferguson et al., After-Affects: How Automatic Evaluations Influence the
Interpretation of Subsequent, Unrelated Stimuli, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 182,
182 (2005) (citing William A. Cunningham et al., Neural Components of Social Evaluation, 85
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 63948 (2003); Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 146480 (1998)).
126. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 474.
127. The mechanisms underlying automatic evaluation are still unknown and are the
subject of extensive theory and discussion. For theories, see Ferguson & Bargh, Constructive
Nature, supra note 111, at 611; Bargh et al., Automatic Evaluation, supra note 116, at
12022; Fazio, supra note 110, at 11921; Ferguson et al., supra note 125, at 18283; and
Mark R. Klinger et al., Mechanisms of Unconscious Priming: I. Response Competition, Not
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emotionally before we can think about it, and sometimes without
ever perceiving it consciously.128 In other words, all that our minds
require to begin working outside our awareness is the mere presence
of an object.
2. Thin slices
It is easy to see the benefit of instant evaluations—after all, we
cannot mull over everything we encounter. If this is true of simple
objects, it is even more true regarding complex encounters, and it
turns out that nonconscious processes aid these decisions as well. We
often make fairly reliable judgments about complex matters without
conscious deliberation, or at least based on so little information that
we have no possibility of conducting a proper analysis.129 Judgments
regarding relatively complex concepts and characteristics are typically
just as accurate—and often more accurate—when based on “thin
slices” of information than when people have more information and
more time to reflect.
Researchers have found evidence of good thin-slice judgments in
a variety of situations. For example, on the basis of extremely little
information, people can intuit gender,130 “interpersonal and
relational variables such as status, kinship, and deception”131 and
possibly sexual orientation,132 and can predict outcomes such as
“teacher effectiveness, interpersonal expectancies, and mental patient
pathology.”133 After short interactions, people tend to rate strangers’

Spreading Activation, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION
441, 44143 (2000).
128. Bargh, Mere, supra note 117, at 28–31; Bargh et al., Generality, supra note 110, at
894–95.
129. Journalist Malcolm Gladwell recently popularized many of these findings. See
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 1847 (2005).
130. Nalini Ambady et al., Accuracy of Judgments of Sexual Orientation from Thin Slices of
Behavior, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 538, 53839 (1999) (finding that people can
determine someone’s gender in the dark merely by watching the individual walk with points of
light on his or her joints for 200 milliseconds).
131. Id. at 538.
132. See id. Several studies suggest people may be able to determine others’ sexual
orientation on the basis of thin-slice judgments, but the results cannot be deemed conclusive.
Id. at 539, 54346.
133. Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
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traits similarly to other people’s ratings and even similarly to the
strangers’ self-ratings.134
Studies of teacher evaluations are particularly persuasive because
they observe teachers in their actual environments.135 The results are
remarkable. Nalini Ambady and Robert Rosenthal conducted a study
in which college undergraduates watched thirty-second silent video
clips of graduate teaching assistants teaching classes and evaluated
them on social characteristics such as optimism and confidence and
non-verbal behaviors such as nodding and gazing downward.136 The
evaluations were averaged into a composite and compared to end-ofsemester student evaluations of teacher effectiveness. Remarkably,
evaluations based on thirty seconds of silent video correlated highly
with student evaluations after semester-long courses.137 The
researchers repeated the same study with high school teachers and
found the same correlation between the thin-slice judgments and
principals’ evaluations of teachers.138 Most astonishing, when the
researchers repeated the experiments with fifteen-second and sixsecond video clips, the results were not significantly different.139
In 1992, Ambady and Rosenthal conducted a meta-analysis of
forty-four studies in which people were given between 30 and 300
seconds to make quick judgments on criteria such as teacher
effectiveness, teacher bias, existence of deception, patient
commitment and compliance with therapy, physician proficiency and
patient satisfaction, comprehension in children, voting behavior,
levels of anxiety, and depression.140 They found robust confirmation

134. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 475.
135. Nalini Ambady & Robert Rosenthal, Half a Minute: Predicting Teacher Evaluations
from Thin Slices of Nonverbal Behavior & Physical Attractiveness, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 431, 432 (1993).
136. Id. at 43235. Ambady and Rosenthal also evaluated several other characteristics,
including whether the teacher was accepting, active, (not) anxious, attentive, competent,
dominant, empathetic, enthusiastic, honest, likable, professional, supportive, and warm. Id. at
433.
137. For the end-of-semester evaluations, researchers averaged students’ responses to the
items “Rate the quality of the section overall” and “Rate the section leader’s performance
overall.” Id. at 433. The judges’ and students’ evaluations correlated at .76, and at .74 after
controlling for the teachers’ physical attractiveness. Id. at 43435, 439.
138. The judges’ and principals’ evaluations correlated at .80. Id. at 43537.
139. Id. at 43738. Across the thirty-, fifteen-, and six-second studies, the judges’ ratings
generally were reliable also in their consistency with others’ judgments. Id. at 43238.
140. Nalani Ambady & Robert Rosenthal, Thin Slices of Expressive Behavior as Predictors
of Interpersonal Consequences: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 256, 26062 (1992).
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that thirty-second observations yielded judgments as accurate as
those derived from extensive testing, performance observations, and
interviews.141 Other studies have shown that quick evaluations are
sometimes more reliable than thoughtful evaluations.142
3. Deciding advantageously without knowing the advantageous
strategy
Humans are not just good at quickly sizing up people’s
characteristics. We also make quick, reliable judgments about
situations that require substantial thought and calculation to be
resolved rationally—and we do so even when we lack the
information necessary for a proper rational calculation. In a classic
illustration, neurobiologist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues
developed a game in which people were given $2000 in play money
and told to gain as much (and lose as little) as possible by picking
cards from one of four decks lettered A through D. Drawing from
deck A or B usually awarded $100 but occasionally carried a penalty
large enough that drawing from those decks would consistently
cause long-term losses. Decks C and D usually returned $50 and
occasionally carried penalties small enough that drawing from those
decks would still result in consistent long-term gains.143 Players had
no idea what the decks would provide, no means of recording or
calculating results, and no ability to project averages. They were not
told how many cards they would be permitted to draw during the
game. As participants played, researchers observed their behavior,
emotions, and thoughts. They recorded the number of times
participants drew from each deck, recorded skin conductance
responses,144 and asked participants two questions after every twenty

141. Id. at 263, 26567.
142. See Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection
Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
181, 18288, 19192 (1991).
143. Antonio R. Damasio et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the
Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293, 1293–95 (1997) [hereinafter Damasio et al., Deciding
Advantageously].
144. A skin conductive response (SCR) is a measure of the electrical conductivity of the
skin. It is calculated by attaching leads to the skin, which measure the skin’s electrical
resistance. See generally Rui Miguel Costa & Francisco Esteves, Skin Conductance Responses to
Visual Sexual Stimuli, 67 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 64 (2008); David L. Neumann &
Paula L. Longbottom, Extinguishing Conditioned Fear with Fear-relevant and Fear-irrelevant
Stimuli by a Context Change After Extinction, 46 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 188 (2008); H.
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draws: (a) “Tell me all you know about what is going on in this
game,” and (b) “Tell me how you feel about this game.”145
After drawing just ten cards, which included some losses from
decks A and B, participants began to generate significant skin
conductance responses when they considered drawing from those
decks.146 After twenty draws, however, players still professed to have
no idea how the game worked. That is, their emotions began
warning them that decks A and B were risky, but they had no
conscious awareness of this. After drawing fifty cards, all players
voiced a “hunch” that decks A and B were riskier, and seven of ten
ultimately articulated a correct theory of the game. Three never
deduced how the game worked but still chose correctly.147
4. Emotion and reason: affect as a decision necessity
There is more to the gambling study than mentioned above, and
the remainder has even more important implications for our
understanding of emotion. In addition to the ten participants,
Damasio and his colleagues ran the same study with six individuals
who had damage to a portion of the brain that is heavily involved in
emotion and, as it turns out, decision making.148 This Article will
return to that study in a moment, after a brief detour to discuss the
brain damage involved and its impact on emotion and decisions.
For years, Damasio has studied and treated patients with damage
to certain areas of the brain.149 One patient, whom he calls “Elliot,”
was an intelligent, successful, able-bodied businessman and a good
husband and father before he developed a brain tumor. After its
removal, Elliot retained his intelligence, use of language, and
physical abilities, but his personality changed dramatically. He now
needed someone to prod him to go to work. Once there, he could
not manage his time. He could spend an entire afternoon
contemplating which principle of organization he should use to file a

Rae Westbury & David L. Neumann, Empathy Related Responses to Moving Film Stimuli
Depicting Human and Non-human Animal Targets in Negative Circumstances, 78
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 66 (2008).
145. Damasio et al., Deciding Advantageously, supra note 143, at 1293.
146. Id. at 129394.
147. Id. at 1293.
148. Id. The subjects had bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortices. Id.
149. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN 54–74 (Avon Books 1995) [hereinafter DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR].
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paper—date, size, relationship to other matters, or any other factor.
Elliot eventually lost his job, squandered his savings on a series of
unsuccessful businesses, divorced, remarried, and divorced again.150
Elliot was brought in to see Damasio after losing his disability
payments. By this time, “[s]everal professionals had declared that his
mental faculties were intact—meaning at the very best Elliot was
lazy, and at the worst a malingerer.”151 Elliot certainly appeared
mentally fit:
[C]learly he knew what was occurring in the world around him.
Dates, names, details in the news were all at his fingertips. He
discussed political affairs with the humor they often deserve and
seemed to grasp the situation of the economy. His knowledge of
the business realm he had worked in remained strong. I had been
told his skills were unchanged, and that appeared plausible. He had
a flawless memory for his life story . . . .152

But Elliot clearly had difficulty making decisions since having his
brain tumor removed. Naturally, Damasio first tested Elliott’s
intellect. He measured intelligence, perceptual ability, long-term
memory, short-term memory, working memory, new learning ability,
arithmetic, language, sorting ability, and ability to make estimates.
On each test, Elliot scored between average and superior. Despite all
his real-life difficulties, he appeared normal or above average on
every measure of intellect and rationality.153
Damasio began to wonder whether he was looking in the wrong
place, and he eventually found that he was. He had always thought
Elliott was surprisingly reserved and unaffected, but over time he
realized that Elliot’s lack of emotion was utterly peculiar. Elliott
appeared not to feel pain or loss over the tragedy in his life. In fact,
Damasio found himself more disturbed and moved by Elliott’s
stories than Elliot himself. As a result, Damasio began to examine
Elliot’s emotions more directly. He showed Elliot pictures of
earthquakes, burning houses, and people with grotesque injuries,
finding that Elliot was unmoved by them. Elliot knew that such
pictures influenced people emotionally—indeed, he said they would
have evoked emotions in him before his surgery—but he did not feel

150.
151.
152.
153.
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anything when viewing them. Since his surgery, Elliot’s emotions
had gone virtually flat.154 And so Damasio began to suspect a link
between Elliot’s two major deficiencies—feeling emotions and
making decisions.
Damasio decided to subject Elliot to another round of tests, this
time examining Elliot’s knowledge about social behavior and his
ability to make moral and ethical judgments. Damasio and a
colleague tested Elliot’s ability to generate options for action, his
awareness of consequences, his ability to conceptualize effective
means of achieving a social goal, and his level of moral reasoning.
Again, Elliot performed well on every test. What, then, the scientists
wondered, could account for the differences in Elliot’s performance
on tests in a lab and his glaring difficulties in everyday life? The key,
it turns out, was that the tests required Elliot only to generate
options; they did not ask him to choose. After generating abundant
options during one test, Elliot remarked, “And after all this, I still
wouldn’t know what to do!”155
Finally, the diagnosis became acute. Elliot and similar patients156
could think rationally—that is, logically—but could not emote as
ordinary people do and had great difficulty making decisions.
Emotion and decision making appeared to be linked fundamentally
in the brain. This suggested that the long-standing conventional
wisdom that too much emotion impairs decision making is at best
only half the story. Too little emotion might be equally or even more

154. Id. at 45.
155. Id. at 46–49.
156. Famed psychological specimen Phineas Gage is the first known person with
symptoms such as Elliot’s. At age twenty-five, a railroad spike blasted through Gage’s brain,
entering his left cheek and exiting the top of his head before landing over a hundred feet away.
Within minutes, Gage was talking calmly, answering questions, and telling bystanders what had
happened. He survived an infection, was pronounced healed within two months, and lived
another thirteen years. But Gage changed drastically after the accident. He no longer observed
basic social norms and could not hold a job. He spent some time selling himself as a circus
attraction, then held a series of manual labor jobs before dying at age thirty-eight, apparently
from epilepsy. Id. at 3–10. Justice William O. Douglas displayed similar symptoms after a
stroke in 1975. Despite left-side paralysis, it was not immediately apparent that he could not
continue on the bench; he retained language ability and appeared to have normal brain
function. Soon, though, his obliviousness to his own condition (he suffered from anosognosia,
an absence of awareness of an injury), his erratic behavior, his poor judgment in everyday
matters, and his inability to observe basic social norms led the other members of the Court to
determine he was unfit. See id. at 68 (citing BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979)).
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harmful.157 Freedom from emotion does not beget good choices, as
we typically assume; it begets an inability to choose.
Damasio began to theorize that, instead of facing the infinite
array of conceivable, logical thoughts and actions in every situation,
some nonconscious affective process rejects many potential courses
of action automatically, dramatically reducing the scope of decision
alternatives.158 He has been developing and testing this theory for
nearly fifteen years with impressive results.159 Without this process, or
something akin to it, decision making would be impossible because
the sheer number of calculations required in any situation would be
paralyzing. Even more important, calculations are only that—
predictions of results. Without emotional evaluations of those
predictions, it is impossible to decide which outcome is preferable.160
In this sense, logical reasoning is like a street map, and affective
processes are what tell us which way to go and how quickly.
When this ability to emotionally experience potential outcomes is
impaired, we can spend hours on even the simplest decisions.161
Damasio relates the story of a patient who had immense difficulty
making the simple choice of when to schedule his next appointment:
I suggested two alternative dates, both in the coming month and
just a few days apart from each other. The patient pulled out his
appointment book and began consulting the calendar . . . . For the
better part of a half-hour, the patient enumerated reasons for and
against each of the two dates: previous engagements, proximity to
157. Id. at 52–53.
158. Damasio theorizes that a system of effective guideposts, which he calls “somatic
markers,” assists the decision process by tagging decision consequences with different valences,
narrowing decision possibilities nearly instantaneously. They can be likened to “gut feelings,”
pre-cognitively. Id. at 171–74; see also ERIC R. KANDEL ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF NEURAL
SCIENCE & BEHAVIOR 596–97 (1995). To explain the simplicity and power of such a process,
Damasio uses the example of bumblebees. Bumblebees do not stop at flowers randomly; they
appear to predict and choose the flowers with the most nectar in advance. This behavior could
be explained by a few basic processes. The bee must be able to detect reward and have an
automated process that produces certain motor results (landing or not) in the presence or
absence of cues (such as color of a flower) that have corresponded (or not) with the reward.
Such a system marks rewarding situations and steers the bee toward them automatically,
without any thought. Furthermore, because of bees’ small capacities for memory, the system
must require only a very small sample size. Apparently, as few as three visits will suffice.
DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 185–87.
159. See Antoine Bechara & Antonio R. Damasio, The Somatic Marker Hypothesis: A
Neural Theory of Economic Decision, 52 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 336 (2005).
160. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 172.
161. See id. at 172–74.
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other engagements, possible meteorological conditions, virtually
anything that one could reasonably think about concerning a
simple date . . . . [H]e was now walking us through a tiresome
cost-benefit analysis, an endless outlining and fruitless comparison
of options and possible consequences. It took enormous discipline
to listen to all of this without pounding on the table and telling
him to stop, but we finally did tell him, quietly, that he should
come on the second of the alternative dates. His response was
equally calm and prompt. He simply said: “That’s fine.”162

“[T]his behavior,” Damasio continues dryly, “is a good example
of the limits of pure reason.”163 Thus, we see that the dominant
model is mistaken in treating emotions as pure objects of decisions
because they are a fundamental part of the decision-making process.
Merely knowing the consequences of actions is not enough;
emotions must tell our bodies which course to pursue, often quickly
and nonconsciously.
Now let us return to the card-game experiment. Recall that the
normal participants began generating anticipatory skin conductance
responses when contemplating the losing decks after drawing just ten
cards, even though they professed strategic ignorance and were
unaware of their emotional apprehensions; and recall that players
who never understood the game nonetheless made good decisions.
The six brain-damaged patients were a striking contrast: none of
them generated a skin conductance response, and none made
advantageous decisions.164 Most astonishing, three of the braindamaged participants eventually deduced as a logical matter which
decks were good and bad but continued to choose poorly.165
B. Affect and Nonconscious Processes in Cognition and Behavior
The research discussed above may be interesting in its own right,
but it provides only a limited view of the picture of human
behavior—a glimpse loosely analogous to the “preferences-asobjects” component in the typical model of decisions. It only begins
to hint at how those processes interact with the environment to
produce our attitudes and behavior, a loose analogy to the “choices”

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 194.
Damasio et al., Deciding Advantageously, supra note 143, at 1293–94.
Id.
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component. Researchers have catalogued myriad ways in which
environmental stimuli, through nonconscious affective processes,
influence our perceptions, attitudes, and, ultimately, behavior. This
section reviews some of those studies, beginning with the simplest.
Here, the line between “preferring” and “choosing”—or feeling and
behaving—begins to blur.
1. Automatic attitudes
a. Mere exposure. Simply being exposed to something will cause
you to like it more, a phenomenon researchers have termed the mere
exposure effect.166 In a typical study, researchers expose people to
objects a varying number of times, then ask the participants to
evaluate several objects, some of which they have previously seen.
People are more likely to evaluate objects favorably when they have
already seen them.167 Equally significant, people are unaware of this
effect. When asked to identify why they prefer certain objects, people
cite a range of factors but rarely mention having seen an object
before.168 Moreover, when researchers ask participants about the
familiarity of objects, subjective judgments of familiarity do not
correlate with tastes; only the number of exposures does.169
This lack of awareness led researchers to suspect that the mere
exposure effect might obtain even when people are wholly unaware
of an object—and it does. In a typical study, researchers expose
participants to objects for a period so brief that they cannot perceive

166. Robert Zajonc, Closing the Debate over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING AND
THINKING, supra note 15, at 35 [hereinafter Zajonc, Closing the Debate]; Robert Zajonc, Mere
Exposure: A Gateway to the Subliminal, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224 (2001).
167. In one experiment, subjects were shown Chinese ideographs once, twice, five, ten,
or twenty-five times. Later, the same objects were presented again, interspersed with others,
and subjects were asked whether each object represented something “good” or “bad.”
Subjects responded positively more often to objects they had previously viewed, and more
exposures yielded higher likelihoods of positive evaluation. Zajonc, Closing the Debate, supra
note 166, at 36. Another study took photographs of pairs of friends or lovers and made both
normal and reversed prints of each. People consistently preferred the reversed image of
themselves over the normal one (the way they see themselves in mirrors) but liked normal
images of their friends and lovers. Id. at 36–37.
168. In the Chinese ideograph study, participants cited factors such as symmetry,
complexity, or shape, or said the ideograph reminded them of a landscape or sculpture. Id. at
40 (“Out of the hundreds of participants we have tested, perhaps one or two have ever said
that the feeling of familiarity was a factor in their preferences.”).
169. Id. at 42.
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the objects consciously,170 then show the participants a pair of
objects, one previously viewed and one new, and ask which one the
subjects prefer and which they have seen before. Participants are
unable to determine which they have seen but select it more
frequently as the one they prefer.171 This effect has been found for a
wide range of objects, such as “geometric figures, random polygons,
Chinese and Japanese ideographs, numbers, letters of the alphabet,
letters of one’s own name, random sequences of tones, non-sense
syllables, odors, flavors, colors, foods, faces, actual persons, and
many others.”172 It has also been found across cultures, various
personality types, and among different species.173
b. Automatic attitudes. Similar to the mere exposure effect,
priming is a phenomenon by which environmental cues can make
certain feelings more accessible to us, thereby altering downstream
attitudes outside our conscious awareness. A most basic example of
priming is a person’s tendency to like something better when primed
with something pleasant. In a typical study, people subliminally
exposed to a smiling face evaluate objects more positively than
people shown nothing, who in turn evaluate objects more positively
than people shown a frowning face. This manipulation can result
from priming stimuli that have nothing whatsoever to do with the
objects being judged and, like the exposure effect, can occur entirely
outside of conscious awareness.174
Priming is not limited to subliminal images of smiling faces.
Automatic attitude formation is ubiquitous, holding for much more
complex attitudes as well. For example, people primed with the word
“achieve” view others as more achieving.175 Priming loyalty increases
in-group favoritism and the identification and expectation of loyal

170. The time period was one millisecond. Id. at 43. This can be termed subliminal.
Most researchers avoid that term because of its stigma, instead using implicit or nonconscious.
171. Id. at 43–44.
172. Id. at 35; see also Robert Bornstein et al., The Generalizability of Subliminal Mere
Exposure Effects: Influence of Stimuli Perceived Without Awareness on Social Behavior, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1070 (1987).
173. Zajonc, Closing the Debate, supra note 166, at 36 (noting effects among “American
undergraduates, nationals of 12 countries, sons of alcoholics, amnesiacs, dieters, chicks,
ducklings, and goslings”).
174. Id. at 49–50, 52–54. For more evidence of positive primes causing more positive
evaluations, see Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility, supra note 122; and Ferguson et
al., supra note 125, at 189–90.
175. Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility, supra note 122.
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behavior from others.176 Priming cooperation or competition
moderates whether people name a prisoner’s dilemma game the
“Community Game” or “Battle of Wits” and whether they express
the intent to cooperate or defect when playing.177 Exposure to
business-related objects such as suits, fountain pens, and boardroom
tables causes people to perceive interactions as more competitive
than cooperative.178 Showing a fat vase to women who are
dissatisfied with their bodies can trigger feelings of body
dissatisfaction.179 Indeed, reading the word “fat” in the preceding
sentence likely accomplished the same. Nonconscious attitude shifts
occur “in an uncontrollable manner similar to how written words
activate their meanings during reading.”180 More broadly, emotions
themselves are contagious. Listening to happy or sad speakers makes
listeners happier or sadder, respectively, and even sitting silently in a
room with someone in another mood can cause others to “catch” a
mood.181
2. Automatic behavior
Given the evidence on automatic attitudes, it should hardly be
surprising that nonconscious affective processes often mediate
behavior as well. More remarkable are the breadth, robustness, and
directness of documented effects, as well as our inability to perceive
or control them. Researchers have found countless ways in which
perceptions of the environment directly influence behavior.

176. Aaron C. Kay & Lee Ross, The Perceptual Push: The Interplay of Implicit Cues and
Explicit Situational Construals on Behavioral Intentions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 634, 635 (2003) (citing Guido Hertel & Norbert L. Kerr,
Priming In-Group Favoritism: The Impact of Normative Scripts in the Minimal Group
Paradigm, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316 (2001)).
177. Kay & Ross, supra note 176, at 637–40.
178. Aaron C. Kay et al., Material Priming: The Influence of Mundane Physical Objects on
Situational Construal and Competitive Behavioral Choice, 95 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESS 83, 87–88 (2004).
179. See Debra Trampe, Diederik A. Stapel & Frans W. Siero, On Models and Vases: Body
Dissatisfaction and Proneness to Social Comparison Effects, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 106, 111–14 (2007).
180. Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95, at 558.
181. Tanya L. Chartrand et al., Beyond the Perception-Behavior Link: The Ubiquitous
Utility and Motivational Moderators of Nonconscious Mimicry, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS,
supra note 94, at 343.
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a. Mimicry. In a “manifestation of the perception-behavior link
at its most fundamental level,”182 we nonconsciously mimic countless
behaviors of others. Is it widely understood that yawns and laughter
are contagious,183 but mimicry extends far beyond these
circumstances. In verbal interactions, we mimic others’ word choice,
sentence structure and grammar, accent, tone of voice, speech
rhythm, duration of speech pauses, and rate of speech.184 We also
mimic facial expressions and other behaviors such as posture and
gestures.185 Mimicry is so nonconscious that our mimicking
movements are sometimes imperceptible to us. A study using
machines to monitor muscle movements found that people
imperceptibly move the muscles involved in smiling when they view
happy facial expressions and the muscles involved in frowning when
they view angry facial expressions.186 Similar studies found that
people’s lip muscles move imperceptibly when they watch a
stuttering person and arm and wrist muscles move when they watch
others arm-wrestle.187
b. Automaticity. Mimicry is only the beginning. Researchers have
found countless ways in which perceptions of the environment
directly influence behavior. For example, priming people with a trait
such as rudeness or politeness skews behavior toward the trait.188 The

182. Id. at 335.
183. Id. at 338 (yawning); id. at 336 (laughter).
184. Id. at 335–36.
185. Id. at 337–39.
186. Id. at 339.
187. Id. at 341.
188. John A. Bargh, Mark Chen & Lara Burrows, The Automaticity of Social Behavior:
Direct Effects of Trait Construct & Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 230, 233–36 (1996). In one study, researchers instructed subjects to construct
grammatically correct four-word phrases out of five-word sets, such as “he it hides finds
instantly,” as quickly as possible. The priming terms were included in the word sets. For
example, to prime politeness, researchers used the terms “respect, honor, considerate,
appreciate, patiently, cordially, yield, polite, cautiously, courteous, graciously, sensitively,
discreetly, behaved, and unobtrusively.” Subjects engaged in the activity one at a time and,
afterward, each was instructed to seek another task from a researcher down the hallway. When
the subject approached, the researcher was engaged in conversation with a confederate. The
confederate timed how long each participant waited before interrupting. Participants primed
with rudeness interrupted more quickly than those whose word task used neutral terms, who in
turn interrupted more quickly than subjects primed with politeness. Id. Subjects did not vary
significantly in their ratings of the experimenter’s politeness; therefore, it is unlikely that the
variation in interruption time was due to variation in perceptions of the experimenter. Id. at
235.
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priming need not be direct. Priming broad schemas that are in turn
associated with specific traits has the same effect. Thus, people act
with more hostility not only when primed with words directly related
to hostility,189 but also when primed with stereotypes associated with
violence.190 Similarly, exposing people to business-related objects
causes them to behave more competitively.191
Our perceptions also automatically influence more complex
behaviors such as exercises of cognitive ability. Thus, priming people
with stereotypes of the elderly not only causes them to walk more
slowly,192 it also diminishes performance on memory tests.193 People
primed with stereotypes of professors or the trait “intelligent”
perform better on tests of general knowledge, while people primed
with the stereotype of hooligans or the trait “stupid” perform more
poorly.194 And reminding people of a negative stereotype applied to
their group harms their performance.195
Given indirect and schema-based activation, these effects can
operate through exceedingly subtle means. For example, asking
African American students to list eight friends who would fit well in
a computer science department—a field in which only four percent
of the population is African American—lowers the students’ sense
that they would fit in computer science, lowers their self-perceived
potential to succeed in computer science, activates thoughts about
their racial identity, and makes them more likely to discourage same-

189. Id. at 236.
190. Id. at 232.
191. Kay et al., supra note 178, at 88–91.
192. Bargh, Chen & Burrows, supra note 188, at 236–38; Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Seeing
One Thing and Doing Another: Contrast Effects in Automatic Behavior, 75 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 862, 865–66 (1998).
193. Ap Dijksterhuis, John Bargh & J. Miedema, Of Men and Mackerels: Attention and
Automatic Behavior, in SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SOCIAL COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR
(Herbert Bless & Joseph Forgas eds., 2000); Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 94, at 466.
194. Ap Dijksterhuis & Ad van Knippenberg, The Relation Between Perception and
Behavior, or How to Win a Game of Trivial Pursuit, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 865,
870–73 (1998). Note that priming an exemplar of a particular type evokes a different
behavioral reaction. Whereas priming “professor” improves cognitive performance; the
opposite occurs for priming with a particular professor against whom people believe they
compare unfavorably on the trait—say, Albert Einstein. Id. at 864–65.
195. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1087–88 (2006) (citing several studies,
mostly in the context of race, where groups performed poorly when primed with negative
stereotypes concerning their group).
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race peers from entering computer science—all without activating in
their minds negative stereotypes about African Americans.196 All that
is needed is to question whether they belong.197
These effects have also been found with respect to goals.
Environmental factors can activate people’s goals and lead them to
behave as they would if they had consciously chosen to pursue the
goals.198 For example, people primed with “achievement” perform
better, persist in tasks longer, and return to tasks better after
interruptions than people not primed with the goal.199 Activating a
broad schema such as a social relationship also can activate goals
relevant to that schema—in this case, relevant to the relationship.
For example, asking people questions about a good friend rather
than a co-worker makes them more likely to help strangers,200 and
priming someone with his or her best friend’s name makes him or
her more likely to explain a stranger’s undesirable behavior by
charitable reference to situational factors rather than the stranger’s
intentions.201 Priming people with thoughts of their mothers causes
them to perform better on intellectual tasks, and all the more so if
they identify themselves as desiring to make their mothers proud.202
And priming people who have long-term goals of fairness and

196. Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Question of Belonging: Race, Social Fit,
and Achievement, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 82, 83–87 (2007).
197. Id.
198. John Bargh et al., The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of
Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1024 (2001); Tanya L. Chartrand &
John A. Bargh, Automatic Activation of Impression Formation and Memorization Goals:
Nonconscious Goal Priming Reproduces Effects of Explicit Task Instructions, 71 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 464 (1996) [hereinafter Chartrand & Bargh, Automatic Activation]. The
mental processes appear identical once the goal is activated. Bargh & Ferguson, Beyond
Behaviorism, supra note 105, at 936.
199. Chartrand & Bargh, Automatic Activation, supra note 198, at 1022–24. Subjects
primed with “achievement” perform better on a word-search task even when all subjects are
instructed “to find as many words as possible.” Id. at 1016–17. Researchers have observed this
effect for the goals of impression-formation, id. at 1016, and cooperation, id. at 1017–18.
Remarkably, although the effect of priming on evaluations fades quickly, goal-priming effects
grow stronger over at least short time periods. Id. at 1020–21.
200. Gráinne M. Fitzsimons & John A. Bargh, Thinking of You: Nonconscious Pursuit of
Interpersonal Goals Associated with Relationship Partners, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 148, 152–53 (2003).
201. Id. at 155–57.
202. Id. at 157–58.
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egalitarianism with the presence of a minority group member causes
them automatically to reduce the use of stereotypes.203
Finally, these automatic effects have been found in far more
abstract behavioral orientations. People primed with words
associated with intrinsic motivation such as “challenge, spontaneous,
[or] mastering” are more likely to enjoy a task, to feel they are
exercising free choice in doing it, and to perform better than people
primed with words associated with extrinsic motivations such as
“restricted, forced, [or] expected.”204 Furthermore, people primed
with the concept of power are more likely to take action in a variety
of situations205 and more likely to think at higher levels of
abstraction.206 Indeed, merely watching people behave in a manner
that suggests they are pursuing a particular goal influences others to
pursue the same goal.207
c. Neurological evidence. In addition to evidence from social
psychology, neuroscience increasingly provides evidence of
nonconscious processes steering behavior—and of a vast disconnect
between people’s awareness, intentions, and actions. There are two
types of evidence in this area: experimental evidence with people
who have brain lesions, and evidence about brain structure itself.
In the first category, experimental evidence with people who
have brain lesions, are individuals who can form accurate impressions
that certain people are friendlier than others without being able to
remember a single thing about any of the people in question.208
Other examples are people who can identify an object such as a book
but are unable to reach for it when asked to do so, and people who
cannot identify the object as a book but, if asked casually to pick up

203. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through
Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (1999).
204. Bargh & Ferguson, Beyond Behaviorism, supra note 105, at 934–35.
205. Adam D. Galinsky, Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Joe C. Magee, From Power to Action,
85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 464 (2003).
206. Pamela K. Smith & Yaacov Troupe, You Focus on the Forest when You’re in Charge of
the Trees: Power Priming and Abstract Information Processing, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 578, 594 (2006).
207. Henry Aarts et al., Goal Contagion: Perceiving Is for Pursuing, 87 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 23, 35 (2004). Unless the observed goal-pursuing behavior is unacceptable, in
which case the opposite effect occurs. Id. at 23.
208. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 43–45 (1999).
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the book, will do so.209 These findings suggest that conscious
reasoning, memory, and intention can be wholly disconnected from
behavior.
Regarding evidence in brain structures, neuroscientists have
found a neurological basis for mimicry and possibly other
manifestations of perception-behavior automaticity in “‘mirror
neurons,’” “in which simply watching mouth, hand, and foot
movements activates the same functionally specific regions of the
premotor cortex as when performing those same movements
oneself.”210
3. Affect and “cold” cognition
Substantial research has also shown that emotion deeply
influences (and is influenced by) “cooler” components of cognition.
Below, this Article sketches emotion’s role in (a) memory; (b)
knowledge structures; and (c) cognitive processing style.
a. Attention and memory. Emotion has several important
influences on memory. First, memories are often biased in a moodcongruent manner, meaning that happy people are more likely to
recall happy memories, sad people to recall sad memories, and so
on.211 Emotions also moderate both attention and long-term
memory retention, playing a substantial role in both whether we
perceive and record information in the first instance and how well we
remember it later.212 This is probably why we are more likely to
remember highly emotional events.213
b. Knowledge structures. Knowledge structures are “‘the building
blocks of cognition’ . . . whose many crucial functions ‘include
classification, inferring additional attributes, guiding attention and

209. Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 44.
210. Id. at 45.
211. KUNDA, supra note 65, at 187–90. There is also mixed evidence that people may be
more likely to recall memories that were formed during a mood that matches the current
mood. Id. at 191–93. Congruence has also expanded to include judgments as well. People in
positive moods are more likely to make more positive judgments about themselves, other
people, and inanimate objects, and the opposite applies to those in negative moods. See
generally id. at 246–49.
212. See generally Elizabeth A. Phelps, The Interaction of Emotion and Cognition: Insights
from Studies of the Human Amygdala, in EMOTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS 51, 58–62 (Lisa
Feldman Barrett et al. eds., 2005).
213. Id.
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interpretation, communication, and reasoning.’”214 Jon Hanson,
who has written extensively about knowledge structures and their
significance to law and legal theory,215 explains with David Yosifon:
We process stimuli “through preexisting systems of schematized
and abstracted knowledge—beliefs, theories, propositions, and
schemas. These knowledge structures label and categorize objects
and events quickly and, for the most part, accurately. They also
define a set of expectations about objects and events and suggest
appropriate responses to them.” Thus, the benefit of such
knowledge structures is that they provide us, often automatically,
with a way of understanding our world so that we can operate
reasonably well within it, at the same time that they free up
cognitive capacity to cope with other pressing issues.216

Knowledge structures are involved in the bulk of the instances of
automaticity discussed earlier in this Article. For example, priming
someone with a material object related to business, such as a
briefcase, causes that person to interpret other people’s actions and
to act herself in a manner more consistent with the knowledge
structure business—for example, more competitively.217 The
knowledge structure, once activated, filters subsequent attention,
memory, cognitive processing, and behavior.
Predictably, given its influence on attention and memory,
emotion heavily influences the operation of knowledge structures:
“When a particular emotion is activated . . . schemas and other
cognitive materials that are tagged with that emotion will be primed
for both the identification of mood-congruent stimulus material and
for the recall of congruent material from memory. In other words,
affect influences the schemas people apply to interpret events.”218

214. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 50–51 (quoting KUNDA,
supra note 65, at 16; LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION
12 (1983)).
215. See Jon D. Hanson & Ronald Chen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 22 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Hanson &
Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 50–83.
216. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 51 (quoting LEE ROSS &
RICHARD E. NISBETT, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 18 (1980) (citing Hanson & Chen, supra note 215, at 1139–77)).
217. See Kay et al., supra note 178, at 87–88.
218. Hanson & Chen, supra note 215, at 1182 (citing Walter H. Crockett, Schemas,
Affect, and Communication, in COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL COGNITION, AND AFFECT 33, 34
(Lewis Donohew et al. eds., 1988)); see also Ralph Erber, Affective and Semantic Priming:
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Affect also moderates the formation and reformation of knowledge
structures. Take, for example, the classic study Hanson and Yosifon
cite in which researchers running a summer camp divided boys into
two groups, Eagles and Rattlers, and had the two groups square off
in various competitions:
[B]oth out-group animosity and in-group solidarity increased
dramatically as the competitions continued, and the resultant
stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination that followed were
robust: “Mere informational campaigns, even those couched in
appeals in moral values, were universally unsuccessful in reducing
enmity. Sunday religious services that interrupted the period of
competition with especially pointed appeals for brotherly love,
forgiveness of enemies, and cooperation had no impact. The
campers solemnly departed from the services and then, within
minutes, returned to their preoccupation with defeating or
harassing the detested out-group.”219

The perception of a threat from another group quickly fostered
the formation of strong negative schemas about the out-group. The
schemas were highly resistant to reasoned discourse and also could
not be undermined merely by “placing the groups in various
noncompetitive settings together—taking meals, filling out surveys,
shooting off fireworks, and so on . . . as subsequent food fights
demonstrated.”220
The enmity diminished only when the researchers began placing
the campers in “situations of mutual dependence and
cooperation.”221
For example, a bus transporting both groups to dinner “broke
down,” forcing the hungry campers to cooperate. With a rope that
had once been used in the tug-of-war competition, the groups
worked to jointly push and pull the bus to restart it. Operating
under such cooperative (“common enemy”) conditions over time,
the campers changed their group-based views of one another and

Effects of Mood on Category Accessibility and Inference, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
480, 480 (1991).
219. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 55–56 (quoting ROSS &
NISBETT, supra note 214, at 40); see also MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT
AND COOPERATION: THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT 117–49 (1961).
220. Hanson & Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 56 (citing SHERIF ET
AL., supra note 219, at 151–58).
221. Id.
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intergroup friendships emerged “between erstwhile rivals and even
former enemies.” By the end of the summer, “the twenty boys
themselves proposed that they return to Oklahoma City in a single
bus, and the self-chosen seating did not reflect the Eagles’ and the
Rattlers’” group identities.222

In other words, the perception of a threat from others fostered
the construction and application of strong negative schemas. These
schemas could not be undone easily through rational appeals or
neutral encounters between the groups. Instead, they were undone
by altering the affective valence of the out-group, by turning enemies
into collaborators.
c. Processing style. Emotion also influences cognitive processing.
Not only are people in positive moods inclined “to like just about
everything better”;223 mood also influences the very processing style
that people use. Researchers discovered long ago that people in
negative moods focus more on details and appear to think more
carefully about judgments. This led some to believe that happy
people’s brains are less active than sad people’s brains, perhaps
because people in good moods are simply less motivated to think
hard.224 This theory accords with the common sense assumption that
negative moods signal to people that something is wrong and they
should remedy the circumstances, whereas positive moods signal that
all is well.
More recent evidence suggests happy brains are no less active
than sad brains. Instead, people in positive moods think just as
actively, but are more likely to employ “top down” processing,
relying more on established knowledge structures. In contrast,
people in negative moods examine contextual details more closely.225
Researchers have found, for example, that people rely on more
scripts—a knowledge structure consisting of a set of expectations for

222. Id. (citing SHERIF ET AL., supra note 219, at 170–71, 182; quoting ROSS &
NISBETT, supra note 214, at 39; quoting ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 611 (2d ed.
1986)) (brackets omitted).
223. SUSAN FISKE & SHELLEY TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 446–47 (1991).
224. Herbert Bless, The Interplay of Affect and Cognition: The Mediating Role of General
Knowledge Structures, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 207–08.
225. Id. at 203.
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the appropriate sequence of events in well-known situations226—
when in positive moods than in neutral or negative moods.227
For example, people in positive moods are more likely than those
in negative moods to recall events that did not actually happen but
that they could expect to have occurred in a given context.228 In a
typical study, researchers described to subjects a narrative about a
common occurrence, such as a dinner outing. In the description,
they included statements typical of the experience (“the hostess
placed the menus on the table”) and information anomalous to the
experience (“he put away his tennis racket”).229 After a short time,
participants were tested on their memory of the narrative by being
asked whether bits of typical and atypical information were part of
the original narrative. Half of this information had been included in
the original accounts, while the other half was new to the
participants. Happy subjects were far more likely than neutral or sad
subjects to “remember” script-typical information, whether they had
heard it or not. Meanwhile, people in all moods remembered scriptatypical information at the same levels.230
Similar results have been found with respect to stereotypes,231
heuristics,232 prior judgments,233 and the fundamental attribution
error234—the failure to account for numerous situational factors that
contribute to observed behavior.235 In each case, happy people rely
more on general knowledge structures or mental shortcuts, while sad
people display a stronger tendency to process the details of a given
situation.

226. Scripts are also termed “event schemas.” FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 223, at 119.
227. Bless, supra note 224, at 205–06.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 205.
230. Id. at 205–06.
231. Id. at 204.
232. Id. at 206.
233. Id. at 206–07.
234. Joseph P. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing Strategies: An Interactive
Relationship, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 270–71 [hereinafter Forgas, Affect
and Information Processing].
235. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 285.
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4. Out of control
It is important to emphasize that there is no easy way for us to
counteract or avoid many of these phenomena.236 As a general
matter, we cannot control all of them because we cannot perceive all
of them.237 But even when we perceive the impact of emotion on our
behavior, we may be unable to control it because emotion has such a
heavy influence on what we think of as “colder” cognition, including
our thoughts about our automatic behavior. Indeed, our very
attempts to evade the influence of affective processes are influenced
by them—even caused by them in the sense that, when we try to
control these processes, it is because we are motivated, emotionally,
to do so.238
a. Affect infusion and over-correction. One example of our
difficulty in counteracting emotion with “reason” is psychologist
Joseph Forgas’s counterintuitive finding that mood states influence
complex decisions more than simple decisions. Forgas categorizes
cognitive processing into four types, in order of complexity: direct
access, motivated, heuristic, and substantive processing,239 and has
236. Bargh, Chen & Burrows, supra note 188, at 241.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 255; Joseph P. Forgas,
Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 46–47 (1995).
Direct access processing requires merely accessing a decision made earlier. People employ direct
access processing when a task is “well known or familiar, and when no strong cognitive,
affective, situational, or motivational cues call for more elaborate processing.” Forgas, Affect
and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 255. Motivated processing occurs when people
are driven to reach a particular conclusion and therefore involves “highly selective and targeted
information search strategies, directed by a specific motivational objective.” Id. at 255–66.
Examples of motivations are self-affirmation, desire to meet expectations, desire for closure,
and the desire for coherence. For more comprehensive overviews of motivated processing see
FISKE & TALYOR, supra note 223, at 211–25; KUNDA, supra note 65, at 212–46; and Hanson
& Yosifon, Situational Character, supra note 1, at 90–115. In heuristic processing, people
cannot rely on stored responses and are not motivated toward a particular conclusion, and they
rely on heuristics to “compute a constructive response with minimal effort.” Forgas, Affect and
Information Processing, supra note 234, at 256. For more comprehensive overviews on the use
of heuristics, see FISKE & TALYOR, supra note 223; and KUNDA, supra note 65, at 53–110.
Finally, people engage in substantive processing when they face “complex, novel or atypical”
tasks, when “there is no motivational goal to dominate processing,” and when heuristics are
unavailable, unhelpful, or unneeded. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note
234, at 256. People employ substantive processing most often when “the situation calls for
constructive, elaborate processing” or when they “need to actually select, learn, and interpret
novel information and relate this information to their preexisting knowledge structures in
order to construct a response.” Id.
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found that contemporaneous mood influences decisions more at
each level of complexity in a process he terms “affect infusion.”240 In
a typical study, subjects are primed with positive or negative affect
(leaving, of course, an unprimed control group). Subjects are then
asked to evaluate various persons or objects such as a series of wellmatched or poorly matched romantic couples,241 a task that requires
different levels of processing.242 People take more time to evaluate
mismatched couples, and emotion influences these judgments
more.243 Other studies asking people to evaluate the causes of
problems in their own relationships (evaluations that require
complex analysis) show high degrees of affect infusion: people
primed with positive affect explain relationship difficulties more
optimistically, blaming problems on external and temporary causes,
while those primed with negative affect are more critical and likely to
blame themselves for problems.244
Forgas’s findings destabilize some of our bedrock assumptions
about decision making—that we can reason away the influence of
emotion, and that quicker, more impulsive decisions are somehow
more “emotional.” His evidence suggests that the more people must
think about a decision, the more influence contemporaneous
emotion has.245 Affect infusion is “most likely when people engage in
genuinely open, constructive processing strategies that require the

240. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 255–59.
241. Couples were well-matched or poorly matched along the lines of race and
attractiveness, features regarding which people expect homogeneity in couples. See Joseph P.
Forgas, Strange Couples: Mood Effects on Judgments and Memory about Prototypical and
Atypical Targets, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747 (1995).
242. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 259–260 (citing
Joseph P. Forgas, On Bad Mood and Peculiar People: Affect and Person Typicality in Impression
Formation, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 863–75 (1992)).
243. Id. at 260–61.
244. Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 261.
245. Id. This is not to say that affect does not play a great role in other decisions as
well—only that current mood is less influential. In less complex forms of processing, affect
influences the decision at a different moment in time. See id. at 258. For example, in directaccess processing, the stored response that a person accesses may be a memory, schema, or
script that was influenced by affect at the time of recording. Motivated processing is inherently
affective; contemporaneously induced mood states have less influence on these decisions
because an overriding affective goal is steering the decision. Moreover, many motivations are
emotion-centered, such as the motive to maintain and repair one’s mood. See id. In heuristic
processing, affect serves as one important heuristic itself, in which people rely on their “gut
feelings.” See generally Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000).
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use of memory-based information to construct a judgment.”246
These tasks “involve the active elaboration and transformation of the
available stimulus information, require the activation and use of
previous knowledge structures, and result in the creation of new
knowledge from the combination of stored information and new
stimulus details.”247 Therefore, the more a person thinks about a
decision, the less able he is to control his emotions by keeping his
emotions out of it.
Another example of people’s inability to control the impact of
emotion on their behavior is when people try to counteract the
effects of their moods. Other studies have shown that people who
are motivated to counteract the effects of their moods often overcorrect and act in a manner skewed toward the opposite emotion.248
This is hardly an absence of emotional influence.
b. The illusion of conscious will. A final reason for skepticism
regarding our ability to counteract the effects of emotion in decisions
is that evidence increasingly suggests that we have little control of
most of our actions—and, indeed, that conscious control may be an
illusion.249 Neuroscientists have found for example that
representations of conscious intentions and representations that
control actions are located in distinct areas of the brain250 and that
the portion of the brain that guides action appears to fire before the
portion of the brain that registers conscious intention.251 This raises
the important point that consciousness and deliberation should not
be confused with control. We do not necessarily control our

246. Joseph P. Forgas & Rebekah East, Affective Influences on Social Judgments and
Decisions, in SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES 198, 203–04 (Joseph
P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003).
247. Id. at 204. It is unclear how far the affect infusion model extends. Even the most
complex processing decisions in Forgas’s experiments could be made relatively quickly and
with little conscious processing. It remains to be seen whether the affect infusion model holds
when people ponder decisions at much greater length. For that reason, the affect infusion
model has greater application at this time to legal situations in which people make relatively
quicker decisions (for example, many consumer contexts) rather than extensively deliberated
and rationalized decisions (such as judicial opinion-writing). The affect infusion model may
hold even farther up the range of decision-making complexity, but the jury is still out right
now.
248. See Leonard Berkowitz et al., On the Correction of Feeling-Induced Judgmental
Biases, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 131, 135.
249. See generally WEGNER, supra note 105, at 29–49.
250. Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 47.
251. WEGNER, supra note 105, at 49–61.
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thoughts and actions even when we perceive ourselves as acting
deliberately.
5. Context-dependent interaction with the environment
The point here is not to suggest that people can be manipulated
predictably and easily. There is no simple relationship between
environmental cues and our attitudes and behavior.252 Countless
studies have shown that the effect of mood on memory, judgments,
and cognitive processing varies across different circumstances253 and
personality types.254 Likewise, the effects of the environment on
attitudes and behavior are complex, often conflicting, and deeply
context-dependent.255 This is only proper. Automatic attitudes and
behavior would have limited value if they remained constant across
varying situations. An efficient system of nonconscious appraisal
must evaluate a bottle of soda differently depending on whether you

252. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to
Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2003) (“An important truism of
social psychology is that people respond not to some objective reality but to their own
subjective interpretations or definitions of that reality. Thus, to understand, predict and
influence a given individual’s behavior, it is necessary to understand, predict, and control the
processes by which that individual ‘construes’ the events to which he or she responds.
Furthermore, variability and unpredictability in such subjective construals can give rise to
variability and unpredictability in behavior . . . .”).
253. See, e.g., Leonard L. Martin, Moods Do Not Convey Information: Moods in Context
Do, in FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15, at 153, 155. It is worth noting that the affect
infusion model, see supra text accompanying notes 239–48, holds that situational factors exert
a strong influence on the extent to which contemporaneous emotion will influence decisions.
This is because emotion’s influence is contingent on the cognitive processing strategy that an
individual uses, and processing strategy is, itself, dictated by situational factors—the type of
decision, the characteristics of the person deciding, and the circumstances in which that person
operates. See Forgas, Affect and Information Processing, supra note 234, at 260.
254. See, e.g., Joseph Ciarrochi & Joseph P. Forgas, The Pleasure of Possessions: Affective
Influences and Personality in the Evaluation of Consumer Items, 30 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
631, 634–35 (2000) (brief review); Cheryl L. Rusting, Personality, Mood, and Cognitive
Processing of Emotional Information: Three Conceptual Frameworks, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 165,
165–68 (1998).
255. Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 39; Bargh & Ferguson, Beyond
Behaviorism, supra note 105, at 931; see also Joseph P. Forgas & Simon M. Laham, The
Interaction Between Affect and Motivation in Social Judgments and Behavior, in SOCIAL
MOTIVATION: CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES 168, 170 (Joseph P. Forgas et al.
eds., 2005) (“[T]he same affective state can have a congruent, incongruent, or no effect on
subsequent motivated action, depending on subtle shifts in people’s preferred information
processing strategies.”).
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will drink its contents or be struck by it, whether you are thirsty, and
whether you desire to lose weight.256
Countless studies document the context-specificity of automatic
attitudes and behavior. A college woman’s level of excitement from
reading a sexually provocative magazine article varies depending on
whether she has been thinking about campus friends or her parents
beforehand.257 Catholic women rate themselves more negatively on
characteristics such as morality, self-esteem, and anxiety after reading
a sexually provocative passage if primed subliminally with a scowling
picture of the Pope.258 A graduate student is more likely to rate her
ideas negatively after subliminal exposure to a scowling picture of her
advisor.259 People are more likely to feel badly about failing at a
task—and to blame themselves rather than the task—if primed with a
relationship contingent on successful performance rather than an
unconditionally accepting relationship260 or primed with the name of
someone significant to them who they feel disapproves of them.261
Automatic effects are also mediated by current motivations,262 and
emotional attempts at persuasion are more likely to succeed if they

256. Ferguson & Bargh, Sensitivity and Flexibility, supra note 122, at 389 (citing Arthur
M. Glenberg, What Memory Is For, 20 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1997)); cf. Berridge, supra
note 35, at 15 (“The sight of food has no intrinsic motivational value. It is merely an
aggregation of visual shapes and colors, like the sight of any object. It is not an incentive until
value becomes attached to it by experience.”).
257. See Mark W. Baldwin, Relational Schema Activation: Does Bob Zajonc Ever Scowl at
You From the Back of Your Mind?, in UNRAVELING THE COMPLEXITIES OF SOCIAL LIFE, supra
note 108, at 55, 56–57.
258. Id. at 59–60 (citing Mark W. Baldwin, Suzanne E. Carrell & David F. Lopez,
Priming Relationship Schemas: My Advisor and the Pope Are Watching Me from the Back of My
Mind, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 435 (1990)). Priming the women with the scowling
face of another individual had no effect. Id. at 60.
259. Id. at 58.
260. Id. at 57.
261. Mark W. Baldwin & Jennifer Meunier, The Cued Activation of Attachment
Relational Schemas, 17 SOC. COGNITION 209 (1999).
262. Melissa J. Ferguson & John A. Bargh, Liking Is for Doing: The Effects of Goal Pursuit
on Automatic Evaluation, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557, 557 (2004).
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match the emotional states of audience members.263 Reactions to
environmental cues also vary with individual characteristics.264
In short, people do not react to stimuli in a simple, predictable
manner; reactions vary across personalities, motivations, needs,
moods, rules, and norms—in short, across all types of situations.
Thus, there is no reason to think we can predict or steer human
behavior with any precision. To say that we often do not control our
own actions is not to say that others control them. At the same time,
we should not underestimate manipulation. There is strong evidence
that our attitudes and behavior can be manipulated outside our
awareness265 and that such influences can be very difficult to
counteract.266 Just as meteorologists can predict probabilities of
precipitation given a set of environmental variables, we can predict
probabilities of human action given a set of human circumstances.
And the more variables we can control, the better the predictions.
Likewise, in human behavior, the more aspects of the situation we
can control, the more behavior can be predicted and controlled. This
is why, as Hanson and Yosifon have written, controlling people’s
situations means controlling their actions, and firms will compete
fiercely to control people’s situations, even without understanding
what they are doing. Hanson and Yosifon have termed this process
“power economics.”267

263. David DeSteno et al., Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of EmotionInduced Expectancies, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 43, 43 (2004). Also, implicit
stimuli often influence us more than do explicit stimuli. See Laura J. Kray, Leigh Thompson &
Adam Galinsky, Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation and Reactance in
Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 942, 943 (2001).
264. For example, priming “power” has differential effects on male sexual arousal
depending on how much men find sexual aggression attractive. John A. Bargh et al.,
Attractiveness of the Underling: An Automatic Power  Sex Association and Its Consequences for
Sexual Harassment and Aggression, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 768, 777–79
(1995). And exposure to images of attractive women harms a woman’s evaluation of her body
image more if she is already dissatisfied with her body. See Trampe, Stapel & Siero, supra note
179, at 106–07.
265. See generally Dijksterhuis, Aarts & Smith, supra note 94, at 82.
266. See, e.g., Aiden P. Gregg, Beate Seibt & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Easier Done Than
Undone: Asymmetry in the Malleability of Implicit Preferences, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (2006).
267. Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 197; see also Hanson & Kysar, TBS I,
supra note 13, at 635.
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C. The Pursuit of Being, Not Well-Being
Rather than suggest that people can be controlled by others as
puppets, the goal of this Article is to outline a more realistic account
of widely ignored or misunderstood forces in decision making,
answer the question of how we navigate the world in light of our
inability to reason through most of the decisions that our
environments demand of us, and determine the proper place of
emotion in theories of decision making. The answer appears to be
that nonconscious, affective processes interact constantly with the
environment and other biological processes (including more
“cognitive” phenomena such as knowledge structures) to direct our
attitudes and behavior.268 The evidence is beginning to suggest that
automatic processes are capable of controlling most aspects of our
behavior—that they even regulate our emotions269 and exercise selfcontrol for us.270 Nonconscious affective processes are likely
homeostatic, designed to promote self-preservation.271 And higherorder emotions may be a complex, highly evolved version of the
basic affective mechanism common to all life: approach and
avoidance.272
This suggests that “preferences” and “welfare” are mistaken
concepts, at least as they are commonly understood. “Preferences”
are the name we give to most salient and acceptable reasons we can
identify for our behavior in various situations, which we believe we
have chosen. This is backward. Rather than mere objects of decision
about which we reason and strategize, the emotional forces that we
268. This research is just getting started. See Bargh, Mere, supra note 117, at 25, 30–31
(“Moods are affected by the general tone of the automatic evaluations made in one’s current
environment, social judgments are influenced by them, and behavioral dispositions at the level
of muscular readiness to approach or to avoid the object are also automatically put into motion
by the evaluative reaction. The power of the affective system to guide subsequent cognition
and behavior is perhaps just beginning to be revealed.”) (citations omitted).
269. See John A. Bargh & Lawrence E. Williams, The Nonconscious Regulation of
Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 429 (James J. Gross ed., 2006).
270. See Ayelet Fishbach & James Y. Shah, Self-Control in Action: Implicit Dispositions
Toward Goals and Away from Temptations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 820 (2006).
This has left some experts wondering what purpose conscious thought serves, the best conjecture
being that it serves nonconsciousness by helping us automate increasing amounts of behavior.
See, e.g., Bargh, Bypassing the Will, supra note 105, at 53; Bargh, Consciousness, supra note 95,
at 563.
271. DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 106, at 30–40.
272. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149; DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note
106, at 40–54.
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call “preferences” are some of the very processes that enable our
bodies to interact with the environment, making decisions for us, in
the absence of conscious monitoring and control. The environment
constantly demands responses from us at a rate and level of
complexity far greater than our conscious reasoning skills can
accommodate, but our nonconscious processes rise to meet this
challenge. Thus, in contrast to the economic assumption that choices
are “preference-satisfying,”273 it would be better to view
“preferences” as “choice-satisfying”: when the situation demands a
behavioral response, the emotional processes that we call
“preferences” provide it. As for “welfare,” unfortunately, there is
little reason to assume that these processes maximize our happiness.
The most we can say without entering a spiritual or religious
discussion is that they help us survive in the evolutionary sense.
Thus, we come to an important distinction between “approach
and avoidance” and “good and bad.” It is analogous to the
difference Dan Gilbert and Kent Berridge have observed between
“wanting” and “liking.”274 Not everything toward which our
affective processes steer us is good, and not everything from which
they steer us is bad. This is why affective processes should be
thought of as approach-and-avoidance or go/no-go processes275
instead of authentic judgments about, or windows into,
“preferences” and “welfare.”
“Good” and “approach” can be misaligned for many reasons.
One important reason is that approach-and-avoidance processes did
not evolve to make us happy, at least insomuch as happiness is
unnecessary to evolutionary fitness. Rather, they evolved to help us
navigate the world.276 Flashing lights automatically engage our
attention but are not necessarily good for us. Their extensive use in
environments carefully structured to extract money from people
(casinos) is probably not welfare-enhancing. And just as insects fly
into bug zappers, human children must be taught not to stare into

273. See supra text accompanying notes 8–12.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 15–36.
275. Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591,
596 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
276. Because these processes are products of evolution, they can be expected to have
numerous arbitrary, and even mildly harmful, effects so long as they are not evolutionarily
lethal. Some may be epiphenomena. Others may be poor but adequate. Still others may have
served a purpose only long ago, under different circumstances.
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the sun. (How are they taught? With warnings about a highly salient
adverse consequence: the possibility of blindness.) Indeed, most
traps that we set for other animals, from bug zappers to duck calls,
employ approach responses harmfully. Our challenge is to recognize
that we have more in common with other species than we think.
To be sure, affective processes mostly serve us well. After all, we
are not dead, and most of us are happy most of the time.277
However, all other things being equal, there is no reason to believe
that emotions exist to make us happy. In turn, there is little reason
to believe that any given behavior reflects a “preference” or anything
other than the context-dependent interaction of our biological
processes with the environment, and equally little reason to believe
that any given behavior increases “welfare.”
IV. THEORIES OF EMOTION IN LAW
Now that we have reviewed empirical evidence on emotion, we
can review legal theories of emotion to see how they fit the evidence
and to determine whether they should be modified. We will examine
rational choice theory, behavioral economics, and cultural cognition
theory, focusing on three questions. First, what does the theory say
about emotion’s role in decision making? (How much role does
emotion play, and is it good or bad? Do authentic preferences exist?)
Second, what does each theory say about the rationality of decisions?
(I consider two kinds of “rationality”—consistency, meaning the
logical consistency of choices, and propriety, meaning the questions
whether choices are in some sense good or correct.) Third, how does
the theory perform in terms of empiricism, parsimony, coherence,
and its normative contribution?278
A. (Unemotional) Rational Choice Theory
Emotion and Rationality. Pure rational choice theory does not
account for emotion as a part of the decision-making process.

277. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ARE WE HAPPY YET? 1 (2006); Diener & Diener,
supra note 56, at 181.
278. Authors associated with each theory likely will dispute some of my characterizations,
and some objections will be well-founded. Authors have not been perfectly consistent or clear
regarding some of the factors on which I evaluate their work. Additionally, summarizing any
broad body of work inevitably requires line-drawing that will result in occasional unfairness. I
apologize in advance for any major errors.

1330

ARKUSH.FIN

1275]

11/24/2008 5:05 PM

Situating Emotion

Instead, it holds that emotion called preferences, welfare, and utility
is exclusively an object of non-emotional decisions. Under this view,
people have authentic, stable preferences, which are revealed by their
decisions. Decisions themselves are rational in that they are
consistent and proper—consistent because they follow logical rules
and proper because they reflect authentic preferences.279 For
purposes of comparison to other legal views on emotion, rational
choice theory may be thought of as unemotional rational choice
theory.
Normative Implications. Part of rational choice theory’s allure is
the clarity and simplicity of its normative implications. The theory
holds that because people generally make good decisions when left
to their own devices—decisions that maximize well-being—policy
makers should let them do so, interfering with free choice only in
instances of market failure. Furthermore, policy makers can ascertain
“value” merely by looking at people’s behavior—for example, by
looking at the price of a good in a well-working market. Although
rational choice theory eschews emotion as part of the decisionmaking process, emotion (as revealed by behavior) is the theory’s
source of authority for policy makers.280
Empiricism, Internal Consistency, and Parsimony. Rational choice
theory, as widely understood, sacrifices empiricism for simplicity,
consistency, and parsimony, and the pure form of the theory’s view
of emotion has limited value in light of widespread evidence that
decisions are irrational and, to a lesser extent, that emotions play a
large role in decisions. These problems have received ample attention
in the legal literature and should not require elaboration here.281
Integrating Emotion into Rational Choice. One rational choice
theorist, Eric Posner, has attempted to integrate emotion into the
theory.282 His goal is to challenge the view of emotions as “‘outside’
forces that compel one to act inconsistently with the interests of the
279. See MARY ZEY, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: A
CRITIQUE 1–3 (1998).
280. See supra Part I.
281. See, e.g., William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 167, 180 (2003) (“In the legal academic pecking order, empirical research does not rank
as high as theory. This translates into a downward shift in the demand for empirical relative to
theoretical scholarship in law and economics.”); Chris William Sanchirico, Finding Error, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (“[I]t is often fair to criticize rational choice theory for being
insufficiently grounded in empirical reality.”).
282. See Posner, supra note 89, at 1978.
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self”283—for example, irrationally—while “hew[ing] as closely as
possible” to the model of rational choices against a backdrop of
stable preferences.284 I believe his attempt is unsuccessful because, in
accommodating emotion into rational choice theory, he loses much
of the theory’s core content.
Posner’s main contention is that people remain fully rational
when in “emotion states” or in “the grip of an emotion.”285 All that
occurs is a temporary change in preferences, abilities and beliefs.286 In
other words, an emotion causes the individual’s utility function to
shift but not to break down.287 Moreover, Posner assumes that
people can anticipate and control their future emotion states and
therefore counteract future shifts.288
This account is flawed first in its assumption that we ordinarily
make decisions in an emotionless state, a view that is inconsistent
with the body of evidence reviewed above suggesting that emotion is
ubiquitous in decision making.289 In short, Posner recognizes
emotion where it is most obvious and salient—for example, in
instances of rage or fear—but misses its presence in other decisions.
Second, while there is some merit to Posner’s view that people can
control their emotions by cultivating them and planning for them, I
believe he overestimates this ability in light of evidence that we are
worse at anticipating our emotions and controlling them than we
believe.290
The account also suffers from another problem. Posner arrives at
a view that looks little like rational choice theory—indeed, one that is
basically situationist. He argues that a model of utility curves that
shift with varying emotional states retains a “rational choice
element” because emotional behavior will “bear some resemblance
to calm-state behavior” and because people in emotion states

283. Id. at 1980.
284. Id. at 1984.
285. Id. at 1982.
286. Id. at 1984.
287. Id. at 1987–88.
288. Id. at 1985.
289. See supra Part III.
290. Blumenthal has already made this criticism. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra
note 4, at 231–32.
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“remain responsive to incentives.”291 But if utility curves shift with
emotional states, and if we modify Posner’s approach to account for
emotion’s presence in a far greater range of decisions, then the
account suggests little more than that individuals respond to their
circumstances at any particular moment. The only claim to
rationality here is that, if put in identical circumstances, a person
would act identically. This bears little resemblance to a model in
which people pursue stable preferences in a rational manner across
time and space. Posner’s view thus loses much of rational choice
theory’s predictive value.
The account also loses rational choice theory’s normative thrust.
Posner believes that either an emotion-state or a calm-state curve
may reflect authentic value for the individual in any given
situation,292 and it is left to policy makers to ascertain which to
value.293 I think Posner is right that either hotter or cooler decisions
may be better for welfare in any given situation. But this approach,
especially when we accommodate a much broader role for emotion
and nonconscious processes in decision making, sacrifices rational
choice theorists’ principle normative claim that utility curves reveal
value.
B. Behavioral Economics, or Emotional Irrational Choice Theory
The term “behavioral economics” has been applied to a large
volume of work that is difficult to characterize succinctly. It can be
said fairly, however, that behavioral economics aspires only to make
piecemeal modifications to rational choice theory in order to make it
more realistic,294 and we can discern a general behavioral-economic
view of emotion. Behavioral economics thus maintains rational
choice theory’s assumption that emotion is mostly an irrational force
that interferes with sound decision making, but it accepts that this
happens in a much broader range of circumstances.

291. Posner, supra note 89, at 1990 (“[W]here the rational choice element remains is in
(1) the insistence that people remain rational during the emotion state, so that their behavior
will bear some resemblance to calm-state behavior, and remain responsive to incentives . . . .”).
292. Id. at 2012.
293. Id. (“Both kinds of preferences must be evaluated, and included in or excluded from
the social welfare function, in accordance with the degree to which satisfaction of them
contributes to the individual’s well-being.”).
294. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1051, 1074–75; Rostain, supra note 7, at 974–
75.
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For purposes of comparison to other views of emotion, we can
think of behavioral economics as “emotional irrational choice
theory” or “emotional irrationalism.” This view holds that emotion
plays a role in many decisions but that emotion is irrational and
distorting in the decision-making process.295 Therefore, decisions are
often inconsistent and improper. Authentic preferences still exist—
they remain the objects of decisions in the form of “welfare”—but
people often act as their irrational selves rather than their rational
selves and fail to pursue their true preferences.
1. Emotional irrationalism’s empiricism
In light of the empirical evidence reviewed above, it is clear that
emotional irrationalism is right about much regarding emotion, and
it is an improvement over rational choice theory. Perhaps it is
surprising, then, that emotional irrationalism still fares poorly on
empirical standards such as coherence and parsimony. Foremost,
emotional irrationalism ignores extensive evidence that emotion
performs a useful function in many circumstances and is probably
essential to decision making.
Additionally, emotional irrationalism continues to assume that
authentic preferences and welfare exist but provides no means of
identifying them and often ignores strong evidence that they do not
exist. Although some emotional irrationalists have noted that the
evidence appears to suggest that preferences are so contextdependent and contingent that “true” preferences may not exist,296
or at least that we cannot discern them,297 the same individuals stake
out positions on paternalism as a general matter and on specific

295. Cass Sunstein has objected to the claim that he views emotional or heuristic decision
making as “irrational,” arguing instead that he would call it “boundedly rational.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1112–13 (2006). I believe the label
“irrational” is fair, at least for purposes of this discussion. Sunstein affirms that his work on risk
regulation addresses the problem of emotionally based “blunders.” Id. at 1121. By my
definition, emotional blunders represent “emotional irrationality” because they result in
inconsistent and non-welfare-enhancing decisions.
296. See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 39, at 1545–46.
297. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 231–32. Although Blumenthal’s
work on emotion is very strong, and more realistic than that of most other irrationalists, see id.;
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (2007)
[hereinafter Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism], I place him here because he appears
concerned primarily with identifying bad decisions and fashioning paternalist responses to
them. See infra text accompanying notes 333–38.
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paternalist policies as well. It is difficult to promote welfare when we
do not know what it is, and difficult to help people make good
decisions when we cannot easily tell the good from the bad. I will
discuss this problem in greater depth below, regarding the normative
work of behavioral economics.
Emotional irrationalists themselves have recognized that their
view is not parsimonious, primarily because they do not attempt a
consistent account of decision making, instead addressing problems
for rational choice theory piecemeal.298 This is problematic because it
creates the risk that policy makers will reach inconsistent conclusions
and promote inconsistent policies. A more fundamental problem is
the division of decision making into several types—such as cognitive
versus emotional and rational versus irrational—without a clear
means of distinguishing the two and without an empirical basis for
the rational, non-emotional decision making that emotional
irrationalism prioritizes. As this Article has detailed, mounting
evidence suggests that affective processes are critical to all decisions;
however, emotional irrationalism holds not only that some decisions
are unemotional, but also that unemotional decisions are generally
better than emotional decisions.299 While psychologists are finding
nonconscious affective processes so robust and effective as to call
into question the necessity of conscious thought,300 and while
neurobiologist Antonio Damasio writes that “[f]eelings of pain or
pleasure or some quality in between are the bedrock of our
minds,”301 a behavioralist ponders whether “some kind of ‘affect’” is
“a necessary or sufficient condition for fear.”302

298. See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 39, at 1545.
299. My point here should not be taken as an argument against all dual-process theories,
which are common in psychology. Behavior relies on numerous processes that can be grouped
into a number of binary categories, such as conscious and nonconscious or automatic and
controlled. The point is that it is mistaken to claim that any particular decision is, or should be,
unemotional. It is probably accurate, however, to speak of two types of emotional decisions:
(1) those that flow more directly from environmental stimuli and (2) those that are mediated
more by knowledge structures and other sources of affect such as other long-term goals and
motivations. See, e.g., Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 340 (distinguishing “primary”
and “secondary” causes of the affective building blocks of decisions). The latter kind of
emotional reasoning corresponds more with our intuitive notion of “reasoned” thought.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 102–69.
301. DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 106, at 3.
302. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 3. Sunstein states on the same page, “I
understand fear to depend on some kind of judgment that we are in danger.” Id. (citing
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 48
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2. Emotional irrationalism and risk regulation
As a normative matter, emotional irrationalism maintains rational
choice theory’s goal of maximizing welfare. However, because
people often cannot be trusted to attain welfare themselves, policy
makers must find a way to ascertain authentic preferences and help
people make good decisions. As a result, irrationalists are
preoccupied with paternalism, debating how, when, and how much
policy makers should interfere with individual decisions.303 The
principal problem for emotional irrationalism is that it lacks a
coherent definition of welfare on which to base policy and lacks a
reliable means of distinguishing good decisions from bad. In this
section, I explore Cass Sunstein’s work on risk regulation in the
book Laws of Fear as an example of emotional irrationalism, using it
to argue that the approach is normatively incoherent and risky for
public welfare.
Sunstein argues that the public is emotionally irrational in
assessing risk; therefore, risk regulation policy should be set, for the
most part, by insulated experts who adhere to more “rational”
analyses.304 We should be wary of this approach not because it would
place decisions in the hands of experts who purport to know better
than the public, which is inevitable unless we regulate through direct
democracy, but rather because it is mistaken about the role of
emotion in policy judgment. If all decision making is emotional at its
core, as the evidence suggests, then Sunstein is mistaken to think
that experts make objective judgments whereas others make
“emotional” judgments. Sunstein also seems not to notice that he
has no definition of welfare on which experts can base their analyses.
In effect, he inadvertently promotes policy making by experts who
make decisions based on their own values rather than the public’s.

(2002)). This view actually has much more in common with emotional rationalism, discussed
below, than emotion irrationalism.
303. See, e.g., Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 297; Colin F. Camerer et
al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2003); Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and
Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 136 (2006); Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 39, at
1541 (styling their approach as “a sort of anti-antipaternalism”); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R.
Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 175 (2003).
304. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 68. Sunstein’s perspective is similar to Justice
Breyer’s. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 33–39, 59–61 (1993).
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As an initial matter, Sunstein makes numerous questionable
distinctions between “rational” and “emotional” judgments. For
example, he sees an emotional mistake in people’s greater aversion to
a risk of cancer death “described in vivid terms[] as ‘very gruesome
and intensely painful’”305 than to the same risk of cancer death not so
described.306 But this is irrational only if we assume that people
should care about absolute numbers of deaths without any concern
for whether the deaths are particularly painful,307 an assumption on
which Sunstein himself casts doubt elsewhere.308 Sunstein also
adjudges that people ought to be willing to pay more per life saved
from catastrophic risks than from risks that implicate fewer deaths.309
It is not obvious that this approach is any more “rational” than
paying an equal amount to prevent all deaths.
These examples highlight our tendency to deem other people’s
judgments emotionally flawed while viewing our own equally
emotional judgments as “rational”—in short, to slip into using the
word “rational” to mean something with which we agree—a
phenomenon I term the emotional attribution error. This type of
error provides a window into a core problem for “libertarian
paternalism”310 and “asymmetric paternalism,”311 which are
emotional-irrationalist approaches meant to answer libertarian or
anti-paternalist concerns by promoting paternalism only where it
interferes with “irrational” and not “rational” decisions.312
Emotional irrationalists often cannot tell the two apart, often for the
simple reason that the distinction is false.313 Although particular
attempts to achieve policy goals can be irrational, for example

305. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 77.
306. Id. at 77–79.
307. Or if we assume that all cancer deaths are “very gruesome and intensely painful” and
that all people know this.
308. Id. at 149 (“Of course different valuations would be justified if they stemmed from
the nature of the risk . . . .”).
309. Id. at 161.
310. See id. at 175; Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 303, at 175.
311. See Camerer et al., supra note 303, at 1212.
312. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 200 (“The justification . . . will depend
on whether there are serious problems of bounded rationality and bounded self-control.”).
313. Again, this is not to suggest that there are no useful distinctions among decisions or
that we will never find cause to prioritize some over others. See supra text accompanying notes
285–86. It is only to say that emotional irrationalism takes an undertheorized approach to this
question.
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because they are inconsistent or contradict the evidence on how to
achieve them, judgments of what goals to pursue are not rational to
begin with. If all decisions, and therefore all policy judgments, have
an irreducibly emotional component, then all contain some arationality. If this is the case, then what rational or objective basis can
experts use in policy making?
Sunstein proposes a cost-benefit analysis in which policy makers
attempt to save the greatest number of lives per dollar.314 But this is
not obviously more rational than a policy that recognizes other
concerns. Imagine a choice between a policy that saves more lives per
dollar but renders most people miserable and one that results in
more deaths but far greater joy among the living. Opinions would
vary widely on which policy is preferable,315 and expert scientists
would not be able to resolve the question objectively.316 Sunstein
barely discusses this type of problem and does not attempt a
solution, even though such tradeoffs are the core value judgments
involved in risk regulation.317 To be sure, Sunstein states that costbenefit analysis is just a tool to promote clear thinking, and that
“[p]articipants in a democratic society may choose to proceed even
when the costs exceed the benefits.”318 But by focusing primarily on
rationalizing risk regulation with cost-benefit analysis, he often
misses the most difficult questions: what counts as a cost or a benefit,
and how do we value these things?319
Sunstein’s answer is to rely on revealed preferences,320 an odd
approach given how much he has destabilized the concept of
preferences. Although Sunstein recognizes that preferences are so

314. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 129–48.
315. And they vary for emotional reasons worth respecting, not reasons we can dismiss
easily as “irrational.” See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of
Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2006) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra
note 7).
316. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004).
317. See SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 149 (noting in passing that “different
valuations [for statistical lives] would be justified if they stemmed from the nature of the risk or
the affected population—and of course we need an account that justifies one assignment of
monetary equivalents rather than another.”) (emphasis added).
318. Id. at 130.
319. For an excellent challenge to cost-benefit valuations in health and environmental
regulation, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 316, at 41–60.
320. See SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 131 (“The idea is that governments assign
monetary values to risks by asking what monetary values ordinary people assign to risks.”).
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contextual and often mistaken that the very meaning of the term is
“unclear,”321 and although he argues that mistaken decisions are not
worthy of respect,322 he grounds much cost-benefit analysis in
revealed preferences in the form of people’s stated willingness to pay
to avoid risks of death.323
This paradox is striking. In the same book, Sunstein is dismissive
of preferences on matters such as savings rates, stating, “The false
assumption is that almost all people, almost all of the time, make
choices that are in their best interest or at the very least are better, by
their own lights, than the choices that would be made by third
parties.”324 When it comes to valuing human life, however, he
ignores this problem. After a short discussion of miswanting and
adaptive preferences, he quickly dismisses them, stating, “[m]uch of
the time, there is no reason to believe that the use of informed WTP
[willingness to pay] (say, $100) is a product of adaptive preferences.
When there is such a reason, the judgment about the Easy Case must
be revised.”325 Sunstein does not provide evidence for the claim that
we rarely need to be concerned with these problems and does not
explain how to revise the analysis when miswanting and preferences
are present. The inconsistency on this matter becomes more explicit
many pages later, in a separate chapter. There, Sunstein identifies
willingness to pay as a model circumstance in which “it is extremely
difficult for contingent valuation studies to avoid constructing the
very values that they are supposed to discover”326 and notes, “[i]t is

321. Id. at 176, 203 (“In such domains, it is unhelpful to say that regulators should
simply ‘respect preferences.’ What people prefer, or at least choose, is a product of starting
points and default rules.”).
322. Id. at 137 (“Even more fundamentally, the relevant numbers [on value of statistical
lives] deserve respect only if they are not a product of an absence of information and bounded
rationality on the part of the people whose choices generate them.”).
323. Id. at 129–74. Kaplow and Shavell display a similar problem. They oppose according
weight to social norms independent of whether people desire them emotionally. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 8, at 988. They also believe social norms are rooted in some form of
emotional appeal. Id. at 1021–27. Thus, they argue on the one hand that people’s liking of
social norms does not mean we should codify them into law and, on the other, that we should
codify into law whatever people like.
324. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 178.
325. Id. at 155. His dismissal of inadequate information and bounded rationality is nearly
identical. Id. at 156 (“In many cases, however, WTP is not a result of inadequate information
and bounded rationality is not leading people to err. If it is, appropriate adjustments should be
made.”).
326. Id. at 190.
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not clear how those interested in eliciting (rather than affecting)
values might respond to this problem.”327
Are people’s judgments to be trusted or not? Are revealed
preferences reliable or not? Because emotional irrationalism stands
with one foot in rational choice theory and the other in a more
situational perspective on emotion, Sunstein has it each way at
various times. First, he argues that people’s emotions cause them to
make bad choices in many instances; and thus, emotionless experts
should make most decisions for them. Then, he abandons these
claims in some contexts and seeks to base policy in part on revealed
preferences, a self-defeating approach if one takes his criticism of
decision making seriously—as we should.
Moreover, a critical realist perspective of the evidence shows that
the problem with preferences is probably much worse than Sunstein
suggests. Preferences are not merely susceptible to a few biases,
however troubling; they appear to be so deeply contextual that they
cannot be taken as authentic expressions of value. This can be
illustrated in one of Sunstein’s principal applications of revealed
preferences—using people’s stated willingness to pay to prevent risks
to their own lives to guide government spending on risk precautions.
Sunstein’s analysis leads him to conclude that experts should spend
less to save poor people’s lives than rich people’s.328 If the poor are
willing to pay twenty dollars to save their lives and the rich are
willing to pay sixty dollars, as the argument goes, then regulators
should value their lives accordingly.329 But a situationist perspective
on emotion recognizes that currency, like everything else, has only a
relative, contextual value. A poor person will spend fewer dollars to
save her life because a dollar means more to her than to a rich
person—not because she values her life less. Given the unlikelihood
that poor people place a lower value on their own lives, the example
says more about the comparative value of money than the
comparative value of life.330

327. Id. at 192.
328. Id. at 162–63.
329. Id. (“[G]overnment should not force poor people to buy more than their WTP to
eliminate statistical risks.”).
330. The relative values of actual currencies provide a useful analogy. Imagine a sweater
that costs $60 and £30. These prices tell us about the relative value of American and British
currency, not the relative value of sweaters to Americans and Brits. From a situationist
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The emotional attribution error and the absence of a welfare
theory in emotional irrationalism explain why emotional irrationalists
offer paternalist responses to decision-making problems primarily
where intuitively appealing policy metrics and responses come readily
to mind. For example, a principal area in which irrationalists have
promoted libertarian paternalism is in retirement savings, where
there is widespread belief that American workers save too little and
that increased savings would benefit them.331 Likewise, in risk
regulation, many of us intuitively agree that we should maximize the
number of lives saved per dollar—that is, until we think about hard
cases. In another example, Samuel Issacharoff and his colleagues
describe their skepticism of paternalism as deriving in part from the
“common intuition that people may have an intrinsic taste for free
choice”332 without responding to the wealth of evidence that this
“taste” may be an example of miswanting. In these instances, we fail
to notice that there are policy judgments to be made and that we
often lack a basis for assuming that intuitive solutions are best.
Conversely, irrationalists shy away from the implications of their
work on emotion where no appealing paternalist approach comes to
mind or where consequences of paternalism seem jarring and
frightening.333 For example, after an excellent survey of empirical
evidence on people’s remarkably quick recoveries from emotional
losses, Jeremy Blumenthal ponders whether our tort system overcompensates victims and over-deters conduct based in mistaken

perspective, even a single currency—or any other object, for that matter—has multiple values
when it is held by different hands in different circumstances.
It is revealing that Sunstein agrees with this situational analysis on the scale of rich
and poor nations. There, he states that it would be “ludicrous as well as offensive” to assume
that differences in willingness to pay reflect differences in the value of lives. Id. at 164. In
wealthy countries, however, he maintains that regulators’ use of willingness to pay “respect[s]
people’s autonomy.” Id. at 165. If inequality that results in varying willingness to pay bothers
us—and it bothers Sunstein, id. at 166—then the solution is wealth redistribution, something
exogenous to risk regulation. Id. at 169. But surely Sunstein does not believe that we can or
should redistribute wealth to the point of creating anything close to actual equality. So the
problem remains: if differences in wealth (not to mention other situational factors) persist, then
willingness to pay is not a reliable basis for policy.
331. See, e.g., id. at 175–76. Sunstein and Thaler advocate opting workers into retirement
savings plans automatically because this change in the default position increases savings rates
dramatically. See id.
332. Camerer et al., supra note 303, at 1214 n.11.
333. Sunstein’s willingness-to-pay analysis is exceptional in this regard and much more
akin to a typical rational choice analysis.
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predictions of future suffering.334 However, he quickly distances
himself from that conclusion335 because he “share[s] the entirely
plausible and legitimate intuition, reified by the legal system, that
when an individual is injured, and is reasonably certain to experience
harm from that injury in the future, that individual deserves
recompense.”336 Blumenthal also displays the emotionalirrationalists’ problematic treatment of welfarism by noting that “we
can never be sure how to maximize happiness or minimize
unhappiness”337 but nonetheless endorsing paternalism with little
attention to this problem, recommending that paternalists add
“emotional ‘errors’” to the list of “cognitive errors” that they try to
cure.338
In sum, emotional irrationalism is correct on some important
points—namely that decision making is often emotional and that
emotions may lead to irrational decisions, at least in terms of
consistency and propriety. However, emotional irrationalists fail to
see that emotion is critical to all decisions. Thus, they miss many
instances of emotion in decision making, fail to see that we must take
care not to dismiss all emotional judgments too quickly, and fail also
to see that even expert decisions rely on emotional judgments.
Emotional-irrationalist debates over paternalism are misguided,
focusing on the choice between people’s “rational” and
“irrational/emotional” selves without seeing that the putatively

334. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 182–86.
335. See id. at 187 (“I should make one point explicit. I do not intend by any of this
discussion to imply that tort victims do not deserve compensation for their injuries, even
intangible ones, or should not be awarded damages for future pain and suffering or emotional
distress.”).
336. Id. Blumenthal provides three other reasons for declining to reduce victim
compensation, but in my view they do not add much to the discussion. First, he notes that
victims will experience some future emotional harm, and the question is really how much. This
fails to support his proposition because it counsels only against eliminating compensation
altogether, not against reducing it even drastically. Second, Blumenthal states that the affective
forecasting literature is too young to be applied without reservation. But his whole discussion
is about the implications for law if that evidence is trustworthy. Finally, he states that our legal
system is committed to “values other than the application of data” such as “finality, fairness,
process, or constitutional principles.” Id. at 187–88. But he immediately folds this point back
into his original intuition that tort victims should be compensated: “Here, we value the
compensation of tort victims, and may continue to do so even in the face of contradictory
evidence.” Id. at 188.
337. Id. at 231.
338. Id. at 237.
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“rational” selves are always emotional to some degree.339 Emotional
irrationalism retains emotion as the object of decision making and
policy but has destabilized the definitions of “preferences” and
“welfare” so much that it is flying blind. Without a coherent
definition of welfare, emotional irrationalists address decision-making
problems mostly where intuitively appealing, non-frightening
solutions happen to present themselves.
C. Cultural Cognition or Emotional Rational Choice Theory
In light of the empirical evidence on emotion in decisions, surely
not all legal theorists view emotions as bad in all instances, right?
Right. Proponents of a more recent view called “cultural evaluator
theory” argue that emotion is critical to rational decisions.340 We can
call this view emotional rational choice theory or emotional
rationalism. In its most important claims, emotional rationalism is
accurate and useful. However, its account of emotion is unempirical
and confused, namely in its suggestions that decisions are generally
rational and that emotions are products of reason.341 Moreover, its
proponents appear ambivalent about the theory’s legal implications.
1. Emotion and rationality
Cultural cognition theory views emotion as integral to most, if
not all, decisions and views this as good. Its core claim is that
people’s attitudes and behavior are predicted by their cultural

339. Kahan and his colleagues advance a similar criticism but believe that emotions are
rational, see infra text accompanying notes 340–88, and do not necessarily recommend a
solution different from Sunstein’s. Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–07.
340. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Perception, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 741 (2008).
341. I have had difficulty providing a coherent account of cultural cognition theory. The
theory is relatively new, with too little writing about it and too little response from other
scholars. Additionally, its proponents have made inconsistent statements on issues that this
Article addresses. It is my hope that this Article will spur useful discussion and clarification.
Where there is an inconsistency, I emphasize in the text of this Article the statements by
cultural cognition theorists that correspond to what I call emotional rationalism because these
statements provide something unique in the legal literature on emotion. Other statements look
basically like emotional irrationalism, treating “culture” as another bias that impedes rational
thought. I note examples of these statements in footnotes. One cannot help guessing an
explanation for the discrepancy. It appears to me that Dan Kahan, the leading cultural
cognition theorist, leans more toward rationalism than his coauthors, who lean more toward
irrationalism. This is because the strongest statement of emotional rationalism is in an article
Kahan authored alone. See id.
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worldviews342—which means their emotions and emotion-laden
knowledge structures. According to emotional rationalism, emotion
is involved in all decisions because it informs people of the value
judgments which they use to make decisions. Apparently, people
make value judgments at some prior time; then, emotions reveal
those judgments to them in moments of decision.343 Emotions are
“expressively rational”344 in that they reflect, and allow people to
perceive, what coheres with their core values.345
Emotional rationalism thus takes a strong position on rationality,
holding that emotions generally reflect consistent, authentic
preferences.346 This is not to say that decisions are always correct but
rather that they are never hopelessly irrational. When emotions are
wrong, it is not because they clash with an individual’s authentic
values. That is the emotional-irrationalist definition of irrationality,
not the emotional-rationalist definition. It is because the underlying
values themselves are wrong. Because “emotions express cognitive
evaluations . . . [they] can and should be evaluated as true or false,
right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, in light of the moral
correctness of the values those emotions express.”347 In sum,
emotional rationalism views emotions as windows into underlying
rational judgments.

342. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1083–84.
343. See Kahan, supra note 343, at 752 (“[E]motions perform a unique role in enabling
her to identify the stance that is expressively rational for someone with her commitments.
Without the contribution that emotion makes to her powers of expressive perception, she
would be lacking this vital incident of rational agency, no matter how much information, no
matter how much time, and no matter how much computational acumen she possessed.”).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 750–51.
346. This is one area where cultural cognition theorists have been inconsistent.
Elsewhere, Don Braman and Dan Kahan have written that cultural cognition is a “bias” that
inhibits proper thinking. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 164–68 (2006) [hereinafter Kahan & Braman,
Public Policy].
347. Kahan, supra note 340, at 762–63; see also id. at 764 (“[T]he view that emotions are
‘judgments of value’ has also been affiliated with the position that emotions can be educated.
The type of instruction this approach contemplates, however, consists not in a stoic program of
disciplining the mind and strengthening the will to resist the supposedly corrupting influence
of emotion on judgment. Instead, it has involved a species of moral instruction that reforms a
person’s emotional apprehension of the social meanings that unjust or destructive states of
affairs and courses of action express.”).
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2. Emotional rationalism’s empiricism
Cultural cognition theorists are right about a lot—particularly
that all decisions likely have an emotional component and that we
should take care not to dismiss too many emotional decisions as
undeserving of respect. Cultural cognition theory is realist and
situationist in its core claim that emotion and emotionally mediated
knowledge structures (“cultural worldviews” in the language of
cultural cognition theory) deeply influence cognitive processing,
attitudes, and behavior.348 This means that people pay attention to,
believe, and remember, information that coheres with and reinforces
their worldviews; they trust information from others who they
believe share their values and distrust information from those who
they believe have opposing values.349 In short, “[c]ulture is prior to
facts.”350 This generally accords with my review of the psychology
literature.351
Cultural cognition is also critically realist in its recognition that
(1) everyone—including experts, policymakers, and the researchers
identifying emotion’s role in decision making—is subject to the
phenomena being documented, which makes it difficult to find
neutral, accurate answers; and that (2) even when we succeed in
finding true answers to some questions, culturally constrained (or
“biased,” in their words) thinking may prevent the dissemination of
and convergence around this information.352 Cultural cognition
theorists are also right to point out the necessity and value of
emotion in decision making and to suggest that we should not be so
quick to dismiss emotional attitudes and behavior as irrational rather
than as expressions of something worthy of respect in a democratic
society.353
An exemplary application of the theory is a recent piece in which
Don Braman and Dan Kahan argue that much of the debate over
gun control is misguided in its focus on consequentialist arguments

348. See Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 157–60.
349. Id. at 155–56.
350. Id. at 150.
351. See supra Part III.
352. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–07; Kahan & Braman, Public Policy,
supra note 346, at 166–68.
353. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–06.
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about public safety.354 Braman and Kahan provide evidence that, for
most members of the public with strong feelings about gun control,
the debate is not about public safety; it is about conflicting visions of
human social and political organization.355 People oriented toward
hierarchy and individualism are more likely to oppose gun control,
while people oriented toward egalitarianism and solidarity are more
likely to support it.356 These cultural orientations filter the
information to which people pay attention, moderate which
information they credit and discredit, and, ultimately, exert strong
influence over their policy views.357 Indeed, cultural orientations
predict people’s views better than any other factor, including
measures of race and geography.358 In Braman and Kahan’s words,
“These dynamics help to explain the persistent ineffectiveness of
empirical data in the American gun debate.”359
Despite making these valuable observations, emotional
rationalism is oddly mistaken about the precise role of emotion in
decision making. In particular, the claim that emotions reflect
reasoned judgments no doubt captures an important aspect of
emotion—that emotions are sometimes products of thought and
even effort—but it is incomplete. To the extent that emotional
rationalism holds that one cannot have emotions without cognitive
judgments, or that emotions are always products of reasoned choice,
these views are out of step with mainstream social psychology.360
354. See Don Braman & Dan Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J.
569, 571–80 (2006).
355. Id. at 571, 582–86.
356. Id. at 578–79.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 579.
359. Id. at 580.
360. Not to mention mainstream legal scholarship. Emotional irrationalism and rational
choice theory, for example, recognize that emotion makes at least some decisions and dispute
only how common the phenomenon is. The mainstream view in social psychology is that
emotion can be wholly distinct from, and precede, reason, see, e.g., Zajonc, Closing the Debate,
supra note 166, at 31–33, and that emotion appears to influence and shape many, if not most,
cognitive or “reasoning” processes, see generally FEELING AND THINKING, supra note 15.
Kahan’s cognitivist approach appears to derive not from psychology or neuroscience
but rather from the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum. Kahan wrote an article with Nussbaum
in 1996 propounding the view, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996), and continues to rely heavily on
her work. See Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 742, 749–50. The 1996 article
pitted an emotional-rationalist-like view of emotion against what strikes me as nearly a
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In holding that emotion does not make (or help make) decisions
but rather enables people to perceive previously made value
judgments,361 emotional rationalism scrubs away emotion’s
evaluative function and molds it back into an object of rational,
emotionless judgments. In this manner, the account looks like a
restatement of rational choice theory with “emotion” more explicitly
playing the role of “preferences” and “welfare.” Emotion is critical
to decisions under emotional rationalism in the manner that
preferences are critical to decisions under rational choice theory:
there can be no decisions without decision inputs. This structural
similarity renders emotional rationalism’s theoretical account subject
to many of the criticisms of rational choice theory—that decisions are
often not rational or welfare enhancing and that emotion has a
substantial, perhaps indispensable, role in the process of decision
making.
Yet emotional rationalism has deeper problems. Foremost, the
theory does not explain the roots of the pre-emotional value
judgments on which it depends. If emotions reveal previously made,
reasoned value judgments,362 then we need an explanation of who or
what makes these judgments. Rational choice theory and behavioral
economics do not have this problem because they assume

caricature of automatic, nonconscious emotion, see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra, at 273–75,
claiming victory for emotional rationalism just as it was becoming untenable in the psychology
literature, compare Zajonc, Closing the Debate, supra note 166 and FEELING AND THINKING,
supra note 15. Philosophers, too, have found Nussbaum’s account flawed. See, e.g., Simon
Blackburn, To Feel and Feel Not, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 2001, at 36 (“Nussbaum writes as
if there were only one kind of rival to the cognitive account: a view that simply adds sensations
or bodily feelings onto the cognitive appraisal. . . . [Her theory] makes emotions intelligent,
susceptible of justification, and even . . . true or false. . . . This is a disappointingly cavalier way
of drawing up the options, especially from someone who has studied eighteenth-century moral
philosophy.”).
Kahan’s attempts to marshal empirical support from psychology and neuroscience
demonstrate only that the evidence is not inconsistent with his theory, not that the evidence
supports his theory. For example, regarding Damasio’s evidence that emotion is crucial to
decision making, see Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 750 (citing DAMASIO,
DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 173–83), and supra notes 337–39 and accompanying
text. Kahan notes, “If being rational consists, at least in part, of ‘see[ing] which values [we]
hold’ and knowing how to ‘deploy these values in [our] judgments,’ then ‘those who are
unaware of their emotions or of their emotional lacks’ will necessarily be deficient in a capacity
essential to be being ‘a rational person.’” Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 750
(quoting MICHAEL STOCKER & ELIZABETH HEGEMAN, VALUING EMOTIONS 105 (1996)).
361. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 752.
362. Id. at 752, 764.
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preferences are given rather than chosen, regardless of their
propriety. Kahan’s claim that decision inputs are products of reason
is difficult to conceptualize without assuming that people are spirited
by immaterial agents who exercise choice for them—a discredited
and unempirical notion.363
Emotional rationalism is also non-parsimonious in that it fails to
account for attitudes and behavior outside the realm of risk
perception. For example, emotional rationalism apparently would
hold that racial prejudice is either an authentic expression of core
values entitled to respect or evidence of an incorrect reasoned
judgment that can be righted through rational discourse. Although
viewing racial prejudice as an incorrect value judgment has some
intuitive appeal, it is doubtful that this represents a complete picture
of the phenomenon or that reasoned discourse alone would remedy
it.364 Similarly, emotional rationalism has nothing to say about
miswanting problems and empathy gaps—widespread evidence that
our thoughts about our emotions are often mistaken.365
It should be apparent that emotional rationalism’s cognitivist
account of emotion also creates an internal inconsistency: on the one
hand, emotional value judgments are products of reason; on the
other, cultural worldviews (which are essentially emotional) have an
overwhelming influence on the reasoning process. Likewise, in
public policy, Kahan maintains that value judgments can be righted
when wrong because they are reasoned, but that value conflicts are
intractable because they are based on cultural worldviews that exert a
high degree of control over reasoning.

363. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN
NATURE (2003). Emotional rationalism, like rational choice theory, also fails to explain the
assumption that decisions are generally correct. This is in contrast to emotional irrationalism,
which holds that decisions are often incorrect but fails to provide a basis for its paternalistic
interventions.
364. To the contrary, a large volume of evidence suggests that racial prejudice is both
generated and expressed beyond our perception, automatically and nonconsciously, and is
difficult to perceive, much less to reason with. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
365. Emotional rationalism’s model also engages without sufficient explanation in a
peculiar human exceptionalism. We expect other animals to lack the self-consciousness and
reasoning ability upon which decision making depends in the emotional rationalist account.
But if this is the case, then how do they make decisions? In fact, some proponents of emotional
rationalism have doubled down on the theory on this point, making dubious claims about
animal cognition, such as arguing that animals have schemes of goals and projects derived from
reasoning about their own flourishing. See Blackburn, supra note 360, at 38 (criticizing
Nussbaum’s humanization of emotions).
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The solution to these problems is to drop the unempirical dead
weight in cultural cognition theory—emotional rationalism, which
holds that people’s value judgments are somehow “rational,”
reasoned, or chosen. With a more realistic vision of emotion, cultural
cognition theory would be more realistic, parsimonious, robust, and
useful. Indeed, notwithstanding its shortcomings on the relationship
between emotion and rationality, cultural cognition theory is correct
in its core contentions. Ample evidence supports the claim that
decisions are constituted from emotional motivations and status
concerns and that information is processed through emotionally
mediated knowledge structures366—a highly realist and situationist
account of attitudes and behavior similar to the one I promote.
3. Cultural cognition and risk regulation
Cultural cognition theorists are ambivalent about the normative
implications of their work, perhaps as a result of under-developed
and sometimes mistaken views on emotion, rationality, and welfare.
Although they apparently take some form of welfarism as their
goal,367 they are unclear on whether they believe cultural cognition
theory will provide answers to policy disputes, will improve political
debate so that the democratic process can yield answers itself, or will
merely assist experts and politicians in selling policies.368 They seem
to waiver between suggesting that policy problems have correct
answers on which people will converge, once the debate is improved,
and saying that policy conflict is intractable. In parallel, they waiver
between populism and paternalism.
Cultural cognition’s emotional rationalist element makes it
appear strongly populist at times. For example, it holds that experts
have little or no special competence to resolve policy disputes
because they demonstrate many of the systematic cultural biases
found in non-experts369 and that everyone’s emotions are entitled to
respect because they are generally rational and, when incorrect, may

366. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1089–96; see also supra notes 342–47 and
accompanying text.
367. See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 149.
368. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1107; Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note
340, at 765 (“[I]nformation about risks must be framed in a way that affirms rather than
denigrates recipients’ cultural identities; to make it possible for persons of diverse cultural
persuasions to experience that affirmation simultaneously . . . .”).
369. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105–06.
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be righted through reasoned discourse.370 This stance on the
rationality of emotions seems to suggest that people eventually will
converge on “true” answers to policy questions. However, Kahan
disclaims allegiance to “pro-market or populist programs of risk
regulation,”371 and he and his colleagues are ambivalent about the
possibility of political consensus.372 They view political debates as
“status conflicts” between competing cultural groups373 and fear that
deliberative democracy could harm individuals by subjecting them to
open “cultural imperialism.”374
Cultural cognition theorists have three answers to this problem,
which, loosely speaking, can be labeled an emotional-rationalist
answer, an emotional-irrationalist answer, and a situationist answer,
respectively. First, if culture-based policy conflicts are intractable,
then Sunstein’s insulated-experts model might be a better means of
regulating risk because its superficially neutral analysis masks and
mutes potentially harmful cultural conflict.375 This position is more
surprising than Sunstein’s. Cultural cognition theorists’ emotionalrationalist tendencies lead them to believe that ordinary people’s
emotional value judgments are rational and worthy of respect in a
democracy.376 They also recognize that experts cannot make policy
without making value judgments and that they will do so in the same
culturally determined manner as non-experts.377 Yet cultural
cognition theorists will consider demurring to what they view to be
370. See id. at 1105 (“When expert regulators reject as irrational public assessments of
the risks associated with putatively dangerous activities . . . they are in fact overriding public
values. For just as citizens’ perceptions of the benefits of these activities express their
worldviews, so too do their perceptions of the risks they pose.”); Kahan, Two Conceptions,
supra note 340, at 760–63.
371. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 762.
372. Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1100–01.
373. Id. at 1095.
374. Id. at 1107 (“At the same time that [cultural cognition theory] extinguishes one
ground for interfering with market and political evaluations of risk—that lay sensibilities are
irrational—[it] arguably creates another: that those sensibilities sometimes reflect an unjust
desire to use the expressive capital of the law to advance culturally imperialist ends.”). Note
that this is a confession either that emotions are not always capable of being reasoned with and
corrected, or that even if they are, there are multiple “correct” emotions.
375. Id. at 1108 (“[Emotional irrationalism’s] analytic deficiencies can be seen as
conflict-abating discourse virtues: precisely because it ignores the decisive role that cultural
values play in shaping competing perceptions of risk, that theory mutes the function that risk
regulation plays in adjudicating between competing worldviews.”).
376. Id. at 1104–05.
377. Id. at 1092–94, 1105–08.
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phony expert paternalism. It is one thing to adopt the emotionalirrationalist approach of labeling certain values bad for welfare and
attempting to substitute better ones; it is quite another to hold that
all public values are entitled to respect but sometimes should be
ignored and muted. Kahan and his colleagues accuse Sunstein in no
uncertain terms of being afraid of democracy, but they may be
equally if not more afraid,378 and they contemplate settling for a role
as communications specialists for paternalists.379
Second, Braman and Kahan suggest “debiasing” public policy
debates by reducing the harmful effects of cultural cognition on
rationality.380 In this respect, their writings are more emotionalirrationalist than emotional-rationalist. Although they argue
elsewhere that policy problems irreducibly turn on value judgments
about which people will never agree,381 here Braman and Kahan
seem to suggest that policy questions may have “true” answers, or at
least answers on which people will converge if their thinking can be
rationalized.382 This answer suffers from a problem discussed
regarding emotional irrationalism: a conflation of what we might call
questions of policy fact with questions of policy judgment. Although
it is correct that emotion and knowledge structures moderate our
processing of empirical knowledge, it is also true that, even when we
have good knowledge, we still must make value judgments about
policy.383 Kahan and Braman no doubt understand this, but much of
their work curiously focuses on “debiasing” the debate on policy
facts with too little acknowledgement that this answers only one part

378. See id. at 1106. Emotional irrationalists fear democracy only insomuch as people
make bad choices; emotional rationalists apparently fear democracy even when people’s choices
are good.
379. See id. at 1107–09.
380. See Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 164–66.
381. See Braman & Kahan, Fear of Guns, supra note 354, at 575 (“No amount of
expected utility analysis can tell us whose vision of the good society—the egalitarian’s, the
hierarchist’s, or the individualist’s—to prefer.”).
382. Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 166–68 (arguing that cultural
cognition biases people’s receptivity to scientific answers on “policy issues”).
383. See infra Part V. For example, regarding gun control, the question which gun policy
results in the fewest deaths is factual, and the question how we act on the answer requires a
value judgment.
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of the cultural-conflict puzzle.384 Even assuming we can settle factual
disputes, policy choices remain.385
Finally, Kahan and Braman advocate searching for policies that
affirm multiple cultural identities at once, thereby breaking political
gridlock.386 This approach is far more situationist in that it surrenders
more to the notions that a-rational value judgments are inherent in
all policy decisions and that successful policies often must mean
different things to different people. This approach also has been
effective and no doubt will continue to be.387 However, it still suffers
from at least two problems. First, it cannot be expected to end policy
conflict because every problem will continue to have numerous
potential responses, even when we restrict ourselves to those with
broad cross-cultural appeal. (Moreover, a good rhetorician can argue
for any policy conclusion from any set of values. Therefore, the
approach may narrow the scope of policy options much less than
Kahan and Braman believe.) Second, something important has been
lost along the way: Kahan and Braman propose only to lessen
political conflict, not to yield good policy—a striking omission for
welfarists. At times Kahan and Braman seem to suggest that experts
need better messaging as much if not more than better policy.388
Moreover, they do not address how we can tell whether one policy is
qualitatively better than another or simply has been sold more
effectively. Some very bad policies may be highly saleable. It seems
intuitive that lessening cultural conflict in society will enhance
welfare, but not if it comes at the cost of enacting harmful policies.
My reading of Kahan and Braman suggests that they sense the
problems I have identified, which is why they vacillate between
suggesting that cultural cognition will help find good policy
solutions, will help improve political debate, or merely help
paternalists sell their policies. Much of this variation results from

384. See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 168–69 (suggesting
that people will converge on policies when they are made receptive to empirical evidence).
385. This parallels the criticism of Sunstein’s cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis
helps only in ensuring consistent pursuit of policy goals; it does not diminish the need for
judgments on what those goals should be.
386. Kahan & Braman, Public Policy, supra note 346, at 168–70.
387. Id. at 167–70.
388. See, e.g., Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 340, at 765 (“[I]nformation about
risks must be framed in a way that affirms rather than denigrates recipients’ cultural identities;
to make it possible for persons of diverse cultural persuasions to experience that affirmation
simultaneously.”).
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inconsistent views of emotion and rationality. For example, if
emotions drive politics, emotions are generally rational, and people’s
emotions differ intractably, then political disputes may be intractable
as well. This view leads to the pessimistic demurral to expert
paternalism. On the other hand, if emotional judgments are
somewhat rational but not intractably different—if they can be
reasoned with or “debiased”—then all we need is better political
dialogue, through which people will converge on policy solutions.
The third way that Braman and Kahan suggest is to find policies that
are saleable to multiple cultural groups, but this approach drops the
search for welfare-enhancing policy entirely. In short, cultural
cognition may suggest several means of muting political conflict, but
it does not help us answer questions about what is good for
individuals and society.
V. REAL EMOTION IN LAW
Finally, we can outline the view emerging from the empirical
evidence, name it, and compare it to theories of emotion in law. This
view holds that emotion is critical to all decisions—not because it is a
decision input, but because affective processes are the very approachand-avoidance or go/no-go processes that moderate other
cognitions and drive most, if not all, behavior.389 Because these
processes are interactions between our bodies and the environment,
they are inherently context-dependent. They generally serve us well,
but did not arise to make us happy.390 Thus, there is no reason to
assume that any particular decision is rational in the sense of
consistency or propriety. This is a critical realist and situationist
account of emotion—critical realist because, following Jon Hanson

389. See Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 360 (“[N]umerous and often conflicting
somatic states may be triggered at the same time, but stronger ones gain selective advantage
over weaker ones. . . . Thus over the course of pondering a decision, positive and negative
somatic markers that are strong are reinforced, while weak ones are eliminated. This process of
elimination can be very fast. Ultimately, an overall, more dominant, somatic state emerges (a
“gut feeling” or a “hunch,” so to speak), which then provides signals to the telencephalon that
modulate activity in neural structures involved in biasing decisions.”); id. at 363 (“The somatic
marker hypothesis posits that when pondering a decision, separate thoughts . . . trigger a
positive or negative somatic state. Depending on the relative strengths . . . of negative versus
positive states, an overall somatic state will emerge that is either positive or negative.”); Zajonc,
Feeling and Thinking, supra note 109, at 167–72.
390. See, e.g., Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 353 (arguing that these processes
evolved from a “fight of flight” response).
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and David Yosifon’s definition of that term, it attempts to derive for
law and legal theory a view of emotion that reflects the best available
evidence about actual human thought and behavior, with the
understanding that we should be skeptical about the possibility of
neutral, apolitical knowledge on the matter.391 It is situationist
because it views emotion not as a mere object of people’s choices,
but instead as one of a myriad of often unseen situational factors that
generate human behavior. We can think of this view as emotional
situationism or emotional realism.
A. Emotional Realism’s Empiricism
Emotional realism squares with all the empirical evidence
presented above and, in accordance with its realist goal, does not
appear to be contradicted by any evidence in the literature. Also,
emotional realism is the only view that explicitly takes a fully
materialist, empirical approach to human behavior, assuming that the
mind is composed of scientifically observable biological processes
that interact with our environments and other aspects of our
biology.392
Emotional realism also requires fewer (if any) dubious
assumptions. Foremost, it eschews the assumption common to other
theories that at least some decision making is emotionless and
“rational.” To illustrate the flaw in that approach, engage in the
following thought experiment: imagine yourself without emotion if
you can. Never mind that your life would be devoid of love,
friendship, and art; imagine the effect on your decisions. Perhaps,
like rational choice theory and emotional irrationalism predict, you
would make better, even perfect, decisions to maximize your . . .
your what? What would be your goals? Why would anything be good
or bad? How would you decide anything? Why would you do
anything? You wouldn’t. Even the simplest decisions require an
affective judgment, and even the simplest behaviors require an

391. See Hanson & Yosifon, Situation, supra note 1, at 181.
392. See DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at 252 (“[T]he comprehensive
understanding of the human mind requires an organismic perspective; that not only must the
mind move from a nonphysical cogitum to the realm of biological tissue, but it must also be
related to a whole organism possessed of integrated body proper and brain and fully interactive
with a physical and social environment.”). See generally Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159
(discussing the influence of emotions in economic decision making and proposing a neural
model for these decisions).
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affective motivation.393 Pure logic cannot make judgments or
animate behavior; it can only predict consequences.
Emotional realism is also parsimonious in that it accommodates
both human and other animal behavior394 and accords with
evolutionary theory.395 It also could perhaps form the basis of a
behavioral model. Because it describes behavior as the result of
various go/no-go forces (mediated through knowledge structures
and other aspects of cognition), it might even be amenable to
modeling. Of course, such a model would be more complicated than
a rational choice model and should be treated as purely descriptive,
not as defining value.
B. Emotional Realism in the Law
Finally, we can discuss briefly what a realist view of emotion
means for the law. Below, this Article outlines a few general
principles, and then it sketches some potential applications.
1. General framework
a. Eschewing “emotion versus reason.” At the most general level,
we should change the manner in which we conceive and discuss
“emotion,” eschewing the simplistic and mistaken “emotion versus
reason” dichotomy and recognizing that emotion is crucial to

393. The same is true for more complex decisions. Imagine a case so squarely controlled
by legal authority that a result is dictated. Emotion is still required to decide the case. The
judge adopts the result dictated by the law only because doing so is more attractive than
aversive in that particular context—for example because the judge fears that the rule of law will
break down if judges do not follow authority or is motivated to affirm a self-image as an
impartial arbiter of law.
394. In fact, emotional realism treats human attitudes and behavior as constructed of the
same building blocks that animate cellular behavior. See, e.g., DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note
106, at 37–54, 144–52 (describing a unified theoretical model consisting of affective processes
nested within affective processes that encompasses phenomena from basic metabolic regulation
in unicellular organisms to complex decision making).
395. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking, supra note 109, at 156 (“Affect is the first link in the
evolution of complex adaptive functions that eventually differentiated animals from plants. And
unlike language or cognition, affective responsiveness is universal among the animal species.”);
id. at 169–70 (“Affect was there before we evolved language and our present form of thinking.
The limbic system that controls emotional reactions was there before we evolved language and
our present form of thinking. It was there before the neocortex, and it occupies a large
proportion of the brain mass in lower animals. Before we evolved language and our cognitive
capacities, which are so deeply dependent on language, it was the affective system alone upon
which the organism relied for its adaptation.”).
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decision making. To be sure, various forms of emotionality are more
and less desirable, and the “emotion versus reason” frame captures
the important point that decision making appears to occur through
varying levels of interaction between primary emotions (quicker and
more immediate, usually provoked more directly by environmental
stimuli) and secondary emotions (from memory, schemas, and
deliberation).396 But this only underscores that it is a mistake to label
“emotion” the culprit. Rather than denigrate emotion outright,
attempts to prescribe behavior should study the role that various
types of emotion play in different situations and inquire how to
promote some influences and mute others.397 Of course, we need a
theory of welfare before we can do this. We should cease insisting
that people think and act “reasonably” or “rationally” rather than
“emotionally.” Or perhaps the word “reason” will come to signify
something more clearly emotional.
b. Process: the primacy of emotion and automaticity. The law also
should take emotion’s role in behavior much more seriously, which
means treating it as primary rather than secondary (or, worse, as a
source of interference) in decisions. Emotion in the form of what is
appealing and aversive is at the core of incentives and behavior. This
means that regulators seeking to influence behavior and to prevent
undesirable influences on people’s behavior should pay far more
attention to non-linguistic forms of information, communication,
and influence. This includes subtle, situational manipulations of
affective cues and emotional communication through direct appeals,
images, and even smells and tastes.
Emotional realism requires us to recognize “reason” or
“rationality” for what it is—an evolutionary late-comer, flawed,
limited, and incapable of directing most day-to-day thought and
action. As a result, we should be less sanguine about remedying
behavioral problems with information or reasoned persuasion.
Additionally, because so much human behavior is nonconscious,
automatic, and not readily amenable to inspection, we should
reevaluate areas of the law that depend on proving states of mind.

396. See Bechara & Damasio, supra note 159, at 340; cf. George Loewenstein & Ted
O’Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior 13–
21 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript).
397. For some work in this area, see Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 297.
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c. Ends: welfarism and revealed preferences. Emotional realism
recognizes that people’s actions do not necessarily demonstrate what
increases their well-being, or even what they think will do so. The
more useful assumption is that actions reveal little more than
people’s interactions with the environment—responses to current
affective incentives, which include both immediate environmental
influences and mental representations of past and future events.
Welfarists should move away from the circular definitions of welfare
and preferences employed by rational choice theory and emotional
irrationalism and instead examine the real causes of human
happiness. At a minimum, strong evidence suggests that material
wealth provides little if any welfare gains to people who already live
above some floor of material comfort,398 suggesting that economic
efficiency should not be a dominant goal of welfarists and that legal
doctrines attuned to efficiency should be reevaluated.
2. Specific applications
a. Employment discrimination. The law of race discrimination has
already benefitted from an application of affective theory. For
example, Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Fiske have argued that
Title VII analysis should account for nonconscious affective
influences.399 They argue that an employment decision is motivated
by a protected characteristic merely when “the characteristic served
as a stimulus which, interacting with the decision maker’s internal
biased mental state, led the decision maker to behave toward the
person differently than he otherwise would.”400 Krieger and Fiske
affirm that this process is often nonconscious and automatic, in
contrast to the prevailing legal assumption that it must be conscious
and deliberate,401 and they recognize that the operation of such
biases is inherently context dependent.402 They argue that jurors
should determine whether this sort of influence took place and even

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

See supra text accompanying notes 16–26.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1, at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
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argue that such a regime will not alter the types of evidence used in
Title VII litigation.403
This work is important, and a very good start, but Krieger and
Fiske may be mistaken to conclude that recognizing Title VII
violations for instances of nonconscious prejudice will change little
about Title VII litigation. To the contrary, the approach might alter
Title VII litigation dramatically or even destabilize the regime
irreparably. The evidence on nonconscious prejudice suggests that,
under a regime that recognizes a violation of Title VII where a
decision has been motivated in any part by nonconscious racial
discrimination, liability will be found in a far higher percentage of
cases, and increasingly so as plaintiffs develop better means of
proof.404 In short, if nonconscious prejudice is as common as
researchers believe, and if plaintiffs learn how to prove its presence in
individual cases, then defendants might lose the majority of Title VII
cases. It is doubtful that this result will be politically or legally
palatable.
There are two potential responses to the Krieger and Fiske
research. First, create some doctrinal limit on Title VII liability for
nonconscious prejudice in employment. For example, rather than
finding liability whenever nonconscious prejudice plays any role in an
adverse employment action, one could establish a minimum
threshold of required influence. A second and more drastic response
would be to conclude that private litigation—or at least the current
private litigation regime—is not a good solution to workplace
discrimination. A full discussion of these issues is well beyond the
scope of this Article. For present purposes, the point is that, as

403. Id. at 1059 (“Under the framework we propose, the evidence would remain much
the same, but the inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence, and the nature of the
ultimate fact the evidence would be offered to prove, would expand to accommodate the
insight that disparate treatment can result from the uncorrected influence of implicit
stereotypes as well as from their deliberate, fully conscious use.”). Jerry Kang and Mahzarin
Banaji have taken a situationist perspective in discussing the question when affirmative action
programs should end. Because there is strong evidence that racial bias operates nonconsciously
and that people are not aware of its influence and do not report it accurately, they argue that
appeals to “colorblindness” are deeply misguided and fixed dates for ending affirmative action,
such as Justice O’Connor’s suggestion of twenty-five years, are arbitrary. See Kang & Banaji,
supra note 195, at 1115–17. Instead, “[f]air measures that are race- or gender-conscious will
become presumptively unnecessary when the nation’s implicit bias against those social
categories goes to zero or its negligible behavioral equivalent.” Id. at 1116.
404. Not to mention that a wealth of currently discounted circumstantial evidence will
have much greater impact on outcomes.
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evidence mounts that most people are unwittingly prejudiced most
of the time, a regime that finds liability for such prejudice may be
strained deeply, then broken, by intractable problems of evidence
and line-drawing.
b. Advertising and consumer protection. Emotional realism also
has substantial implications for consumer law. Foremost, it suggests
that advertisers will strive to influence people nonconsciously and
affectively, seizing upon the mechanisms outlined in Part III above,
in what I would term affectising. A mere glance at television
commercials confirms this.405 Policymakers should undertake a
serious analysis of the benefits and harms of attempts to influence
people emotionally and nonconsciously, for “feelings are the sensors
for the match or lack thereof between nature and circumstance.”406
Emotional realism also predicts that consumers will be influenced by
other forms of persuasion such as statements deemed so outlandish
that no “rational” person would believe them, statements made only
for entertainment value, and statements of opinion. Contemporary
consumer law, with its rationalized focus on false factual claims
(“deception”) and unavoidable harm to consumers (“unfairness”),
has virtually nothing to say about these forms of communication,
even though they are the principal means by which firms attempt to
influence consumers.
If one maintains the goal of rationalizing or debiasing consumer
decisions, then a potential response to affectising is an effects test
under which a statement is unfair or deceptive if it makes an effective
claim that is not a true statement of fact. By definition, these
communications succeed by influencing people in a manner other
than by engaging their rational faculties. However, such an approach
may be overbroad. Given limited human capacities for information
processing and reasoning, it seems likely that non-linguistic and
emotional forms of communication may be desirable in some
instances. The difficulty, then, will be discerning the valuable from
the wasteful and harmful.

405. For excellent work on this point, see Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note 13;
Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13.
406. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR, supra note 149, at xv (“And by nature I mean both
the nature we inherited as a pack of genetically engineered adaptations, and the nature we have
acquired in individual development, through interactions with our social environment,
mindfully and willfully as well as not.”).
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Other aspects of consumer law require reexamination as well—
for example, laws regarding causation and states of mind. The
evidence reviewed in this Article suggests that the causes of
consumer choices are often unknown and unknowable, even to
consumers themselves.407 This suggests that requiring consumers to
show reliance on particular representations might be nonsensical and
harsh in some instances.
Similarly, regarding sellers’ states of mind, firms should be
expected to attempt to influence consumers in numerous ways that
the firms themselves do not understand, and to succeed in many
instances.408 This means that many unfair and deceptive practices will
not necessarily be intended. Moreover, the question whether a
deceptive act is committed intentionally should have little bearing on
its legality. For these reasons, common-law seller scienter
requirements, still present in some consumer protection statutes, also
may present a senseless and often insurmountable hurdle for
consumers. For these reasons, recent attacks on modern consumer
protection statutes that urge stricter common-law standards of
reliance and seller intent409 may be deeply flawed.
Finally, advertising is becoming increasingly narrowly targeted at
particular individuals and situations—acutely tuned to reach just the
right person, in just the right way, in just the right context—to
maximize a-rational influence on people.410 These efforts may cross a

407. See supra Part III.B. This is a core feature of automaticity research. For a superb
overview on how nonconscious processes guide behavior outside our awareness, see TIMOTHY
WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002).
408. As Hanson has explained in several different articles, firms are in stiff competition to
influence consumers, experimenting constantly with different approaches, and can be expected
to succeed in many instances even without understanding what they are doing. See Hanson &
Kysar, TBS I, supra note 13; Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13; Hanson & Yosifon,
Situation, supra note 1.
409. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GRIEVE, HARM-LESS LAWSUITS? 4–9 (2006); Victor E.
Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1 (2006).
410. See, e.g., Michele Gershberg, Yahoo Beefs Up Target Advertising Tools, REUTERS,
July 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSSP25867220070702 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2008) (describing Yahoo’s plans to use behavioral targeting to fine-tune
advertisements to particular users); Alana Semuels, Yahoo Lets Consumers Opt Out of Targeted
Advertising. Everyone Rejoice?, BLOG OF THE L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8 2008,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/08/yahoo-lets-cons.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008) (describing Yahoo’s decision to let users opt out of targeted advertising, a
response to scrutiny of targeted advertising by the House Energy and Commerce Committee
of the United States House of Representatives).
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threshold that regulators and judges should recognize as “unfair.” A
difficult inquiry, ripe for examination, is how the concept of
“unfairness” might extend, in a principled manner, to embrace some
forms of intense targeting of individual consumers and consumer
subpopulations.
In sum, emotional realism counsels a broad reexamination of
advertising law, including legal treatment of marketing content,
delivery methods, and burdens of proof and defenses in litigation.411
c. Other substantive applications. A realistic view of emotion
should have numerous other applications, particularly for areas of law
concerned with intent, decision making, or non-linguistic
communication. For example, contract law perhaps should
acknowledge more instances of emotional weakness sufficient to
undo contracts, and perhaps judges should be especially sensitive to
the potential for harm and manipulation by false friends and
romantic partners.412 More generally, tort and contract law perhaps
should acknowledge that different emotional relationships between
people might give rise to different legal rights and obligations.413 In
the First Amendment context, evidence of the importance of nonlinguistic communication may counsel for better protection of
expressive conduct.
In criminal law, emotional realism’s insight into incentives might
alter the punishments we enact. For example, we punish “heat of
passion” crimes less because we find them less morally repugnant.
Emotional realism suggests that this retributive approach may defeat
our deterrence objectives. If the key to deterring a crime is to create
negative consequences so emotionally salient that they outweigh the
affirmative motivation to commit an unlawful act, then perhaps heat
of passion crimes require stiffer consequences (or just very different
ones). The stronger one’s emotional motivation to commit a crime,

411. Little work has been done in this area. In the products liability context, Hanson and
Kysar have argued that problems of market manipulation bolster the case for enterprise
liability. See Hanson & Kysar, TBS I, supra note 13; Hanson & Kysar, TBS II, supra note 13.
David Hoffman has argued for a rebuttable presumption that puffery is unlawful. See David A.
Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever (June 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
412. See Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 297, at 66; Ethan J. Leib,
Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 685–94 (2007).
413. See, e.g., Leib, supra note 412, at 685–94 (analyzing potential unique rights and
obligations in the context of friendship). Another area ripe for inquiry is the law of transactions
between emotional humans and organizations that do not experience emotion.
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however momentary, the stronger the emotional deterrent needed to
stop it.
d. Something missing in law school admissions. Finally, setting
aside substantive law, emotional realism also suggests that there may
be something important missing in law school admissions. If
emotion is critical to reason—if all judgments are based upon
emotions and emotional values—then law schools may be remiss to
rely heavily on the Law School Admission Test, which evaluates
reading comprehension and logical reasoning, and to ignore
measures of emotional or social intelligence.414 This proposition may
sound radical. But given the importance of emotion in decisions—
particularly in social decisions, the core province of law—we may be
deeply mistaken to train new lawyers, judges, and policymakers who
excel in traditional measures of intellect without ensuring that they
also have good emotional faculties.
3. Emotional realism in risk regulation
Finally, having discussed the shortcomings of emotional
irrationalism and emotional rationalism in the risk regulation
context, it is necessary to explain why emotional realism might
provide a better approach. The starting point is that we have no
coherent, settled definition of welfare on which to base policy.
Notions of the good appear to be irreducibly a-rational and
impervious to scientific resolution; therefore, normative economics is
pseudoscience, and policy making tailored to its vision of welfare is
the pursuit of particular values behind a mask of neutrality.415
Neither emotional irrationalism nor emotional rationalism answers
this problem.
Emotional realism suggests a potentially fruitful line of inquiry by
refocusing, as this Article has focused, on processes rather than
objects. I mean this in two ways. First welfare, like the emotions that
it represents, is probably better viewed as a process than an object.
We should conceptualize well-being as the process of being well, not
as a set of objects amenable to enumeration and accumulation. To be
sure, empirical evidence provides a basis for object-like components

414. See generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN
MATTER MORE THAN IQ (1997); GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 56.
415. For similar views, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 316, at 8–12; Kahan
et al., supra note 315.
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of welfare, such as minimum standards of material comfort and
equality, below which people are demonstrably unhappy.416 But aside
from baselines of wealth, equality, and autonomy, the evidence
suggests that we experience well-being for the most part through
processes such as close relationships and activities that engage our
skills and interests constructively, not through the acquisition and
retention of objects and statuses.417 This may mean that some
processes (such as close relationships and engaging activities) are so
generally good for well-being that regulators should promote them
as policy objects. Or it may mean simply that policy makers should
foster circumstances under which people can engage in flourishing
behavior on their own. Even more simply, policy makers might start
by reducing impediments to such activity.418
Second, if we cannot agree on the objects of policy—for
example, the amount we are willing to pay to save a life—then we
should work to find good processes for resolving them. Regarding
the process of fashioning risk regulation policy, emotional realism
suggests that the insulated-experts model is deeply mistaken.
Regulators should attempt to incorporate public emotion (albeit
with moderation) rather than insulate policy from it. Because we
cannot define welfare without resorting to emotional value
judgments, policy makers have no purely rational metrics to follow,
and they need emotional guidance, whether their own or the

416. See supra text accompanying notes 16–26. This suggests that a policy of maximizing
the size of the economy and the efficiency of legal rules at the expense of ensuring minimum
living standards and better distribution of benefits is wasteful and misguided from a welfarist
perspective.
417. See supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing close well-being and relationships);
MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE (1990);
DAMASIO, SPINOZA, supra note 106, at 137 (“Joyous states signify optimal physiological
coordination and smooth running of the operations of life.”).
418. For example, policy makers could work to reduce economic stress and lack of
autonomy in people’s lives even if those changes appear to come at the expense of economic
models of efficiency. And we should reexamine government interference with welfareenhancing processes—for example, marriage. Given strong evidence that marriage is one of the
clearest sources of positive well-being, laws banning marriage between consenting adults, such
as homosexual marriage bans, may be exceedingly cruel and costly in terms of well-being,
preventing people from engaging in an activity more likely than any other to contribute to
their happiness. (There is still a lurking empirical question whether close relationships between
unmarried people yield similar happiness.) If the Constitution provides any substantive due
process protection, it should provide a right to engage in the personal relationship more likely
than any other to yield well-being, and states ought to meet an extremely high burden to
interfere with it.

1363

ARKUSH.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/24/2008 5:05 PM

[2008

public’s. Insulated experts may pursue policies that do not reflect
public values, or even policies that harm people, and their sterile,
technical analyses may miss problems that the public’s affective
processes can perceive. Moreover, as cultural cognition theorists
point out, it is difficult to argue in a liberal state that the public’s
value judgments are not entitled to respect.419 At the same time, it is
not clear that the cultural-cognition approach of finding policies that
appeal to people of differing cultural worldviews will yield good
policy, rather than merely muting political conflict. Also, the
approach retains a highly paternalist element because someone still
must choose policies and devise the means of selling them to the
public. Finally, the greatest risk in paternalist approaches is their
potential to undermine even the baselines of well-being—minimum
standards of material wealth, equality, and autonomy under which
people can flourish. History instructs us amply on the dangers of
paternalism, particularly when it is not grounded in coherent theory
and policy makers lack clear boundaries.
For all of these reasons, risk regulation should reflect public
emotion at least as much as it should be protected from it. At the
same time, risk regulation should not be derived directly from public
input (for example through direct democracy). This is for two
reasons. First, although emotions underlie all policy judgments,
emotional realism recognizes that people’s emotions are not always
good for them and may be spectacularly wrong in some instances,
particularly, as Sunstein argues, when they are products of highprofile scares.420 Therefore, we would be mistaken to plug public
emotions directly into policy without some kind of moderator or
gatekeeper.421 Second, individuals can make only a limited number of
reasoned decisions, and many decisions, or merely having too many
decisions, can burden us and diminish our well-being. We lack the
time or resources to reason carefully about many aspects of our lives
and therefore properly rely on others to help us.
419. See Kahan et al., supra note 315, at 1105. Also, the failure to address certain types of
emotionality in policy can cause unhappiness. That is, even if the public’s concern for
something appears misguided, the public cares nonetheless and might be harmed by regulatory
inattention to the perceived problem. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 316, at
130–36. Sunstein appears to agree with this point. See SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 127.
420. SUNSTEIN, FEAR, supra note 7, at 89–106.
421. Of course, as discussed earlier in this section, we should seek a means of
distinguishing the good from the bad better than the emotional-irrationalist approach of
guesswork and intuition.
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Our best hope in risk regulation, then, is to place policy in the
hands of experts, but also to ensure that they share public values. In
short, we need well-functioning republicanism. This proposition is
strikingly absent from the risk regulation debate, given its prospects
for moderating between expertise and public values. Republicanism
is also sorely lacking in the contemporary administrative state, which
is composed of officials appointed by the President (who is never
elected or defeated on the basis of an administrative appointment)
and characterized by regulations and procedures that are opaque and
inaccessible to the general public.
A discussion of how best to foster republicanism in risk
regulation is obviously beyond the scope of this Article, but several
possibilities are worth exploring. One approach would be to employ
periodic citizen panels with diverse memberships to develop expertise
and recommend policies. Another would be to rely as we currently
do on professional experts, but also to make them more accountable
to the public, perhaps through direct elections. Others possibilities
are to enhance citizen participation in special commission
recommendations or in the agency rulemaking process. Whatever the
means, the goal is simple: we want other people to make important
decisions for us, and we want those people to share our values. It is
unlikely that regulators will share our values at all times, given the
differences among us. That is why they must be accountable to us,
ensuring that policy judgments are accessible and susceptible to
modification.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to say much, but it can be reduced to
a single point—law and legal theory treat emotion primarily as an
object of reasoned decisions and policy making and as a source of
interference in decisions, but empirical evidence suggests that
emotion is a behavioral process that is critical to decisions. This shift
in viewpoint has widespread implications for law, legal theory, and
policy. As a descriptive matter, it suggests that we should reevaluate
legal doctrines that rely on the assumption that humans are mostly
emotionless actors and reexamine areas of law that concern consent,
states of mind, and the causes of behavior. As a normative matter,
emotional realism suggests that we have no empirical or even
internally consistent definition of welfare on which to base policy.
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Welfarists should seek a new definition, and they are more likely to
find it in processes than in objects. There is much work to be done.
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